This argument enrages especially those libertarians who have the good sense at least to recognize and despise Bush's despotism. "Anti-war" libertarians (among them, many current boosters for the candidacy of libertopian flavor of the month Ron Paul) who refuse to own up to the definitive trace of their own market utopianism in the plans and then edicts of neoliberal reconstruction that articulated the very war and occupation they now claim resolutely to oppose are a special case of the more general principle.
But it should go without saying that one doesn't escape culpability for one's part in ruinous outcomes just because one has the sense to recoil from the spectacle of that ruin as it unfolds. And this is especially so when complicit parties not only fail to recognize their conspicuous part in disasters decisively of their making but then actually go on in or even redouble their evangelical efforts, releasing ever more urgently and hysterically the energies of ruin even as they superficially decry some of the evident and horrifying consequences.
Another passage in David Harvey's A Brief History of Neoliberalism (which I cannot recommend highly enough to your attention) seemed to me striking in this connection:
We can [understand] neoliberalization either as a utopian project to realize a theoretical design for the reorganization of international capitalism or as a political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites…. [T]he second of these objectives has in practice dominated. Neoliberalization has not been very effective in revitalizing global capital accumulation, but it has succeeded remarkably well in restoring, or in some instances (as in Russia and China) creating, the power of an economic elite. The theoretical utopianism of neoliberal argument has, I conclude, primarily worked as a system of justification and legitimation for whatever needed to be done to achieve this goal. The evidence suggests, moreover, that when neoliberal principles clash with the need to restore or sustain elite power, then the principles are either abandoned or become so twisted as to be unrecognizable. This in no way denies the power of ideas to act as a force for historical-geographical change. But it does point to a creative tension between the power of neoliberal ideas and the actual practices of neoliberalization that have transformed how global capitalism has been working over the last three decades.
Market libertarian (in Harvey's phrase, "neoliberal") formulations provide the rationale for social and economic policies that serve incumbent elites in a way that is doubly difficult to unknot.
First, articles of market fundamentalist faith are utterly unrealized (not ot mention being, in fact, unrealizable, because they are at root incoherent, as witness: (a) that markets express a "spontaneous order" hampered by rather than articulated by state actors, (b) that there are no rational conflicts between people despite overabundant evidence to the contrary, (c) that optimizing for "efficiency" is one and the same thing as general welfare even when it is achieved through the externalization of the costs and risks of enterprise, (d) that market outcomes are uncoerced by definition whatever the circumstances may be, and so on) and, hence, immune from criticism from real-world perspectives.
As such, Second, they would have no real-world life at all except that they provide ongoing justification for policies that in fact straightforwardly preferentially benefit incumbent elites, which policies are treated as wavering cave-wall projections of the bonfire of market fundamentalist pieties. The disasters and failures that ensue from literally every this-worldly application of these libertopian pieties is always attributed by its True Believers as an expression of the debasing presence of the State, and so every failure always only confirms the faith, and the ferocity of this accumulating commitment always only enables further, disastrous, plutocratic "mis"-applications of the faith.
In short, plutocratic policies, which are the only actually realizable applications of market fundamentalist faith, will also always only be taken as mis-applications of that faith by its faithful. Hence, the failures of market ideology will always function to bolster it, and hence continue to fuel the politics of elite incumbency (that is to say, in our time, in the ongoing consolidation of a neoliberal/neoconservative corporate-militarist global order) in which market ideology, quite contrary to the self-image of some of its partisans, has its entire realized worldly life.