Using Technology to Deepen Democracy, Using Democracy to Ensure Technology Benefits Us All
Sunday, May 31, 2009
More On Freedom
An Anonymous comment in the Moot wants to know what I mean when I bemoan the "reductionism that misconstrues human freedom as instrumental power." Just who and what sorts of things do I have in mind when I say this? It is actually a question that takes us right to the heart of political thinking, really, especially for somebody indebted to Arendt as I am.
In a nutshell, I would worry about the reductionism of anybody who says that the more tools you have at your disposal to do things with, the more free you are. Especially if the person saying it seems inclined to treat this as anything like the end of the story. This is not to deny that it is nice to have more tools with which to do useful and edifying things (all other things being equal), but it is to say that this is to confuse efficacy for freedom.
Freedom is a political matter, the quintessential matter of politics indeed. In politics, we are not billiard balls banging meaninglessly into one another across a felted surface, in trajectories that can be exhaustively calculated in advance, where what matters is the augmentable or diminishable intensity of force with which the balls are flung and colliding. Where we assume the vantage of the political we are not billiard balls banging about, and we do not treat one another as billiard balls to bang. (This is not to deny that there are other salient vantages we can assume in respect to human conduct and understanding, by the way.)
Freedom is present or not, experienced or not, facilitated or not, from moment to moment -- but it does not accumulate, it does not amplify, it does not hoard, it does not improve. Freedom plays out in the world.
We are free when we act in the world in the company of the diversity of our peers. We are experiencing and actualizing our freedom when we offer up out of our thinking, out of our judgment, out of our privacy a text, declaration, or deed to the hearing and responsiveness of a diversity of our peers in the world. We do this without any certainty what will finally come of our releasing this eruption, this interruption into the world, knowing well that in taking up our text, our declaration, our deed the world will collaborate in the meaning available in it.
What matters is our owning of the text, the declaration, the deed, and the recognition, the substantial being, conferred on us by that diversity of others when it is taken up in the world, a recognition and substantiation in which our own-ness, our public self is produced and maintained in the world, as a peer among peers, as a legible subject with a critical purchase and take on the world that obliges response and responsibility from our fellows.
This recognition conferred in the transaction of free action doesn't require agreement from our fellows, but only the affirmation that the assessment to which we attest, the exertion arising out of our intention is legible as issuing from a peer. A peer is emphatically not an equal, nor an intimate, but one who registers in their alterity both their equity in respect to us and their diversity from us. An action is our own, and that we are our own can be conferred only by the collaborative recognition of our actions as actions among peers -- we can no more substantiate ourselves on our own than we can be free in isolation from one another. In declaring a thing beautiful (or offering up a beautiful thing to the reception of the world), for example, we seek less the affirmation that our judgment is shared but that even where it is not shared the declaration is taken to issue from a subject of a taste that is their own who values a thing that is valu-able even by those who do not value it.
Freedom can be easily destroyed -- it is incredibly fragile -- by the obliterative instensities of pain or of pleasure, by violence, by duress, by immiseration, by isolation, by the lack of a context of trust or legitimacy to give a home to these precarious transactions.
Freedom is usually present when we collaborate toward the accomplishment of a shared task, each contributing their separate measure to that accomplishment, each co-ordinating that effort through the communication of their ongoing re-assessments of the scene. This may be part of what makes us so prone to confuse efficacy with freedom, especially since the capaciousness enabled by tool and technique is often experienced, for a time, as freedom is, as novelty, interruption. Freedom is indeed often present when we take up a tool, and especially when we turn the tool to some unexpected use, or teach another what can come of the tool, or when we declare in the hearing of company that the tool is fine or failed, good or evil, beautiful or ugly.
But freedom is not a matter of making a selection from a menu provided by others, and not augmented by the expedient of being provided ever more items on the menu from which to make a selection. Freedom doesn't accumulate like gold pieces in a vault. It cannot be saved, or hoarded, or amplified. Freedom isn't dumb force, however ferocious, however capacious.
One is either free or not, from moment to moment, one is either experiencing freedom or not, from moment to moment, one is either actualizing freedom or not, from moment to moment. Nobody is free every minute of the day, even in a free country, nor are many of us ever so unspeakably miserable as to be unfree every minute of the day -- outside the hideous extremities of deeply criminal regimes and personal devastations.
But it is true that a form of government that values freedom can provide for more occasions for its actualization among its citizens, while another that disvalues freedom can frustrate its play. It is important to recognize that a society of uncritical conformists and consumers is quite as threatened in its freedom as a society of totalitarian tyranny isolated by terror and mistrust from taking up the risk of freedom and savoring its bounty.
The robotic world of the futurologists is a barren world without freedom in it, only meaningless calculations and amplifications of force. And what is to be most repudiated and feared is not the eventual consummation of their inhuman utopia of heartless hopeless crystal -- horrifying enough though that obliterative consummation would be. No, what is to be repudiated and feared is the degradation of our sense of ourselves in the present, the indifference to ourselves in our freedom and fragility in the present, the obliteration of regard for our social and embodied and contingent agency as it is, peer to peer, equitable and diverse, promising and forgiving, assertive and uncertain in the present.
There is little that is more precarious than freedom. Even where it is valued and facilitated, it scarcely outlasts the moment of the transaction in which it is actualized, the judgment offered up to the hearing of the world, the enterprise offered up to the co-ordination of one's collaborators. Although there is more to flourishing than the experience and actualization of freedom, and although a life lived interminably in the exactions of freedom would little likely be a flourishing one, a life without freedom is no more worth living than an unexamined life is. And again, while it is unquestionably nice to have nice and useful things at one's disposal it is the worst kind of nonsense to confuse such possessions with freedom or in the mad pursuit of them find freedom a mirage.
In a nutshell, I would worry about the reductionism of anybody who says that the more tools you have at your disposal to do things with, the more free you are. Especially if the person saying it seems inclined to treat this as anything like the end of the story. This is not to deny that it is nice to have more tools with which to do useful and edifying things (all other things being equal), but it is to say that this is to confuse efficacy for freedom.
Freedom is a political matter, the quintessential matter of politics indeed. In politics, we are not billiard balls banging meaninglessly into one another across a felted surface, in trajectories that can be exhaustively calculated in advance, where what matters is the augmentable or diminishable intensity of force with which the balls are flung and colliding. Where we assume the vantage of the political we are not billiard balls banging about, and we do not treat one another as billiard balls to bang. (This is not to deny that there are other salient vantages we can assume in respect to human conduct and understanding, by the way.)
Freedom is present or not, experienced or not, facilitated or not, from moment to moment -- but it does not accumulate, it does not amplify, it does not hoard, it does not improve. Freedom plays out in the world.
We are free when we act in the world in the company of the diversity of our peers. We are experiencing and actualizing our freedom when we offer up out of our thinking, out of our judgment, out of our privacy a text, declaration, or deed to the hearing and responsiveness of a diversity of our peers in the world. We do this without any certainty what will finally come of our releasing this eruption, this interruption into the world, knowing well that in taking up our text, our declaration, our deed the world will collaborate in the meaning available in it.
What matters is our owning of the text, the declaration, the deed, and the recognition, the substantial being, conferred on us by that diversity of others when it is taken up in the world, a recognition and substantiation in which our own-ness, our public self is produced and maintained in the world, as a peer among peers, as a legible subject with a critical purchase and take on the world that obliges response and responsibility from our fellows.
This recognition conferred in the transaction of free action doesn't require agreement from our fellows, but only the affirmation that the assessment to which we attest, the exertion arising out of our intention is legible as issuing from a peer. A peer is emphatically not an equal, nor an intimate, but one who registers in their alterity both their equity in respect to us and their diversity from us. An action is our own, and that we are our own can be conferred only by the collaborative recognition of our actions as actions among peers -- we can no more substantiate ourselves on our own than we can be free in isolation from one another. In declaring a thing beautiful (or offering up a beautiful thing to the reception of the world), for example, we seek less the affirmation that our judgment is shared but that even where it is not shared the declaration is taken to issue from a subject of a taste that is their own who values a thing that is valu-able even by those who do not value it.
Freedom can be easily destroyed -- it is incredibly fragile -- by the obliterative instensities of pain or of pleasure, by violence, by duress, by immiseration, by isolation, by the lack of a context of trust or legitimacy to give a home to these precarious transactions.
Freedom is usually present when we collaborate toward the accomplishment of a shared task, each contributing their separate measure to that accomplishment, each co-ordinating that effort through the communication of their ongoing re-assessments of the scene. This may be part of what makes us so prone to confuse efficacy with freedom, especially since the capaciousness enabled by tool and technique is often experienced, for a time, as freedom is, as novelty, interruption. Freedom is indeed often present when we take up a tool, and especially when we turn the tool to some unexpected use, or teach another what can come of the tool, or when we declare in the hearing of company that the tool is fine or failed, good or evil, beautiful or ugly.
But freedom is not a matter of making a selection from a menu provided by others, and not augmented by the expedient of being provided ever more items on the menu from which to make a selection. Freedom doesn't accumulate like gold pieces in a vault. It cannot be saved, or hoarded, or amplified. Freedom isn't dumb force, however ferocious, however capacious.
One is either free or not, from moment to moment, one is either experiencing freedom or not, from moment to moment, one is either actualizing freedom or not, from moment to moment. Nobody is free every minute of the day, even in a free country, nor are many of us ever so unspeakably miserable as to be unfree every minute of the day -- outside the hideous extremities of deeply criminal regimes and personal devastations.
But it is true that a form of government that values freedom can provide for more occasions for its actualization among its citizens, while another that disvalues freedom can frustrate its play. It is important to recognize that a society of uncritical conformists and consumers is quite as threatened in its freedom as a society of totalitarian tyranny isolated by terror and mistrust from taking up the risk of freedom and savoring its bounty.
The robotic world of the futurologists is a barren world without freedom in it, only meaningless calculations and amplifications of force. And what is to be most repudiated and feared is not the eventual consummation of their inhuman utopia of heartless hopeless crystal -- horrifying enough though that obliterative consummation would be. No, what is to be repudiated and feared is the degradation of our sense of ourselves in the present, the indifference to ourselves in our freedom and fragility in the present, the obliteration of regard for our social and embodied and contingent agency as it is, peer to peer, equitable and diverse, promising and forgiving, assertive and uncertain in the present.
There is little that is more precarious than freedom. Even where it is valued and facilitated, it scarcely outlasts the moment of the transaction in which it is actualized, the judgment offered up to the hearing of the world, the enterprise offered up to the co-ordination of one's collaborators. Although there is more to flourishing than the experience and actualization of freedom, and although a life lived interminably in the exactions of freedom would little likely be a flourishing one, a life without freedom is no more worth living than an unexamined life is. And again, while it is unquestionably nice to have nice and useful things at one's disposal it is the worst kind of nonsense to confuse such possessions with freedom or in the mad pursuit of them find freedom a mirage.
Saturday, May 30, 2009
Futurological Reification, Reduction, Reaction
There is no such thing as "technology" at the level of generality at which people tend to talk about "technology." It makes no sense to celebrate or to abhor "technology in general," it makes no sense to champion, defend, resist "technique" as such, "artifice" as such.
There are techniques and devices that are useful in some contexts and less useful in other contexts and damaging in other contexts, there are particular technoscientific developments, applications, distributions that are, for the moment, and never universally, disruptive, empowering, provocative, indifferent, unexpectedly potent when conjoined with other developments and so on. But there is no "technology in general" that is monolithically "liberating," "alienating," "progressing," "accelerating," and to speak this way is always, always to peddle mystifications and obfuscations.
There is never anything clarifying to the process of technodevelopmental social struggle -- the collective, collaborative, antagonistic struggle of the diversity of stakeholders to technoscientific changes as they opportunistically make recourse to and sense of those changes -- by speaking of that complex, dynamic, open process of technodevelopmental social struggle through the vapid abstraction "technology."
Already we are well aware of the tendency of the word "technology" to attach very selectively, never to describe all the things in our environments which are artificial, but especially those artifacts which are taken to be provocative in their novelty or unfamiliarity or salience. That is to say, we fail to think of our everyday clothes as "technology" but only our presently-fetishized wearable devices, we fail to think of our everyday language as "technique" but only our jargon. The artifactual is ubiquitous, quotidian, and yet our imagination of the "technological" is freighted with the special fears and fantasies of agency, especially at its disturbing edges, with fears of impotence and fantasies of omnipotence, with death-defying medicines and wish-fulfilling devices and apocalyptic weapons of mass destruction and industrial-extractive pollution and catastrophic climate change. These assignments of what is to us familiar or not, novel or not, salient or not, and just how, are in fact the furthest thing from universal or obvious. These assignments are historical, they are social, cultural, and political.
Too often, "technology" is a word through which a partisan (or simply an uncritical inhabitant) of a particular parochial and interested vantage within the ongoing dynamism of technodevelopmental social struggle renders or simply uncritically acts as if every other vantage within that struggle is inconsequential or invisible altogether. "Technology" is a word that would identify some particular constellation of devices and techniques and the assignment to them of particular saliences and ends with every conceivable or relevant instance of artifice or device or technique, every vicissitude of technoscientific change in history, every impact of that change on whatever stakeholder to it, whatever their differences.
It is interesting to note that the ongoing historical distinction in discourse of what passes for "the natural" from what passes for "the artificial" has always functioned to delineate the customary from the novel, the familiar from the unfamiliar, the taken-for-granted from the threat/promise of the disruptive, and so has functioned in the service of a depoliticizing assignment of "inevitability" to the status quo as well as in the service of a politicizing insistence that things can be otherwise if we educate, agitate, and organize to make them so. The "technological-in-general" tends to function as a kind of depoliticizing re-naturalization within the de-naturalized "artificial," a way of divesting that which is made by us and so could be made different by us of their openness, weighting them down with the parochial assumptions and ends of incumbent interests. The open futurity available in every moment of technodevelopmental social struggle, vouchsafed by the enabling and frustrating contestation of an ineradicable diversity of stakeholders to the terms of change in the moment of change, in the presence of that change -- the open futurity in the present that is freedom -- is depoliticized, re-naturalized, through the substitution of a false "technology in general" for the always-partial always-contingent always-uncertain always-opportunistic engagement in that technodevelopmental social struggle on its own terms and our own.
That is why I say that "the future" is a racket, a de-politicizing substitution of some funhouse mirror of the present for the open futurity in the present that is freedom. "The future" of the futurologists is always a retro-future, always a dream of a maintenance and amplification of the prevailing or romanticized terms of incumbency.
Consider this tendency to reactionary reification in futurological discourse in connection with its tendency as well to a reductionism that misconstrues human freedom as instrumental power, and so with its characteristic gesture of reducing human beings to machines. The endlessly-deferred futurological predictions of the arrival of artificial intelligences and robots indistinguishable from humans are in fact symptomatic expressions of their prior misconstrual of actually-existing social and organismic human intelligence as computation and actually-existing social and organismic human people as robots. Futurological discourse at its most extreme (and consistent) seeks to compensate for this inaugural mutilation of humanity and human freedom by investing in a fantasy of an ecstatic amplification of instrumental capacities amounting to demi-deification.
Of course, this pined-for "transcension" through "technology" of their humanity into a superlative post-humanity, is simply the reductio ad absurdum consummating their initial mistaken and infantile assumptions, their would-be transcension amounts to little more than an evacuation of meaning and sense and humanity, their "post-humanity" an exaggerated testament to their palpable alienation in the present. The bankruptcy of the status quo confronts the Superlative mirage of "The Future" that is uniquely its own -- its rugged possessive isolated individualism exaggerated into promises of prosthetic near-immortalization (superlongevity), its valorization of short-term greed exaggerated into promises of better-than-real immersive digital virtualities, and robotic or nanobotic wish-fulfillment devices (superabundance), its reductive consequentialist and profit-taking rationality and "neutral" cost-benefit analyses exaggerated into promises of post-biological artificial intelligences reckoning with consequences in the abstract, searching through digital "problem-space" and thereby finding in a flash "the solutions" to all our problems (superintelligence).
"The future" of the futurologists is nothing but an absurd and delusive imperializing fantasy of the amplification and eternalization of the neoliberal status quo. It is nostalgia peddling itself as innovation. It is incumbency peddling itself as novelty. It is stasis peddling itself as change. It is hype peddling itself as seriousness. It is navel-gazing peddling itself as problem-solving. It is conservative politics peddling itself as progressive politics.
There are techniques and devices that are useful in some contexts and less useful in other contexts and damaging in other contexts, there are particular technoscientific developments, applications, distributions that are, for the moment, and never universally, disruptive, empowering, provocative, indifferent, unexpectedly potent when conjoined with other developments and so on. But there is no "technology in general" that is monolithically "liberating," "alienating," "progressing," "accelerating," and to speak this way is always, always to peddle mystifications and obfuscations.
There is never anything clarifying to the process of technodevelopmental social struggle -- the collective, collaborative, antagonistic struggle of the diversity of stakeholders to technoscientific changes as they opportunistically make recourse to and sense of those changes -- by speaking of that complex, dynamic, open process of technodevelopmental social struggle through the vapid abstraction "technology."
Already we are well aware of the tendency of the word "technology" to attach very selectively, never to describe all the things in our environments which are artificial, but especially those artifacts which are taken to be provocative in their novelty or unfamiliarity or salience. That is to say, we fail to think of our everyday clothes as "technology" but only our presently-fetishized wearable devices, we fail to think of our everyday language as "technique" but only our jargon. The artifactual is ubiquitous, quotidian, and yet our imagination of the "technological" is freighted with the special fears and fantasies of agency, especially at its disturbing edges, with fears of impotence and fantasies of omnipotence, with death-defying medicines and wish-fulfilling devices and apocalyptic weapons of mass destruction and industrial-extractive pollution and catastrophic climate change. These assignments of what is to us familiar or not, novel or not, salient or not, and just how, are in fact the furthest thing from universal or obvious. These assignments are historical, they are social, cultural, and political.
Too often, "technology" is a word through which a partisan (or simply an uncritical inhabitant) of a particular parochial and interested vantage within the ongoing dynamism of technodevelopmental social struggle renders or simply uncritically acts as if every other vantage within that struggle is inconsequential or invisible altogether. "Technology" is a word that would identify some particular constellation of devices and techniques and the assignment to them of particular saliences and ends with every conceivable or relevant instance of artifice or device or technique, every vicissitude of technoscientific change in history, every impact of that change on whatever stakeholder to it, whatever their differences.
It is interesting to note that the ongoing historical distinction in discourse of what passes for "the natural" from what passes for "the artificial" has always functioned to delineate the customary from the novel, the familiar from the unfamiliar, the taken-for-granted from the threat/promise of the disruptive, and so has functioned in the service of a depoliticizing assignment of "inevitability" to the status quo as well as in the service of a politicizing insistence that things can be otherwise if we educate, agitate, and organize to make them so. The "technological-in-general" tends to function as a kind of depoliticizing re-naturalization within the de-naturalized "artificial," a way of divesting that which is made by us and so could be made different by us of their openness, weighting them down with the parochial assumptions and ends of incumbent interests. The open futurity available in every moment of technodevelopmental social struggle, vouchsafed by the enabling and frustrating contestation of an ineradicable diversity of stakeholders to the terms of change in the moment of change, in the presence of that change -- the open futurity in the present that is freedom -- is depoliticized, re-naturalized, through the substitution of a false "technology in general" for the always-partial always-contingent always-uncertain always-opportunistic engagement in that technodevelopmental social struggle on its own terms and our own.
That is why I say that "the future" is a racket, a de-politicizing substitution of some funhouse mirror of the present for the open futurity in the present that is freedom. "The future" of the futurologists is always a retro-future, always a dream of a maintenance and amplification of the prevailing or romanticized terms of incumbency.
Consider this tendency to reactionary reification in futurological discourse in connection with its tendency as well to a reductionism that misconstrues human freedom as instrumental power, and so with its characteristic gesture of reducing human beings to machines. The endlessly-deferred futurological predictions of the arrival of artificial intelligences and robots indistinguishable from humans are in fact symptomatic expressions of their prior misconstrual of actually-existing social and organismic human intelligence as computation and actually-existing social and organismic human people as robots. Futurological discourse at its most extreme (and consistent) seeks to compensate for this inaugural mutilation of humanity and human freedom by investing in a fantasy of an ecstatic amplification of instrumental capacities amounting to demi-deification.
Of course, this pined-for "transcension" through "technology" of their humanity into a superlative post-humanity, is simply the reductio ad absurdum consummating their initial mistaken and infantile assumptions, their would-be transcension amounts to little more than an evacuation of meaning and sense and humanity, their "post-humanity" an exaggerated testament to their palpable alienation in the present. The bankruptcy of the status quo confronts the Superlative mirage of "The Future" that is uniquely its own -- its rugged possessive isolated individualism exaggerated into promises of prosthetic near-immortalization (superlongevity), its valorization of short-term greed exaggerated into promises of better-than-real immersive digital virtualities, and robotic or nanobotic wish-fulfillment devices (superabundance), its reductive consequentialist and profit-taking rationality and "neutral" cost-benefit analyses exaggerated into promises of post-biological artificial intelligences reckoning with consequences in the abstract, searching through digital "problem-space" and thereby finding in a flash "the solutions" to all our problems (superintelligence).
"The future" of the futurologists is nothing but an absurd and delusive imperializing fantasy of the amplification and eternalization of the neoliberal status quo. It is nostalgia peddling itself as innovation. It is incumbency peddling itself as novelty. It is stasis peddling itself as change. It is hype peddling itself as seriousness. It is navel-gazing peddling itself as problem-solving. It is conservative politics peddling itself as progressive politics.
Friday, May 29, 2009
Dispatches from Libertopia: Going Galt on the High Seas (to Infinity and Beyond!)
Brad Reed has some good fun with the latest -- Remember Sealand? Remember Residensea? -- klatch of deluded market fundamentalists who are now threatening to pack up their toys (whatever those might be) and deprive us of their talents (whatever those might be) and found separatist libertopian enclaves on concrete platforms or cruise ships or under domes on the seafloor or comparable corporate futurological nonsense. Perhaps they could build a lovely casino and vacation home complex Dubai style on that oceanic landfill of discarded plastic blobbing upon our wide blue still under-polluted oceans.
Although these fantasies of self-appointed sooperman sequestration are a recurring libertopian wet-dream, it is apparently an especially alluring notion now that these would-be titans and grifters fear they might actually be taxed and regulated a little in an Obama Administration (if only) thus slowing by a smidge their relentless ongoing (or at any rate pined for) looting and raping of the planet and of the overabundant majority of the people and other beings who share it with them.
You can tell these boys are serious because, among other things, they've founded an Institute. And they've published an online manifesto and FAQ. Always with the "Institutes" and "manifestos" with these boys, ain't it though?
Anyway, Patri Friedman (from neolib Milton to anarcho-capitalist David to anarcho-separatist Patri, from bloody-cuffed shirtsleeves to straightjackets in three generations) is a high muckety-muck in this endeavor. And it's interesting (I can't say it's surprising) to find Peter Thiel right at the heart of this laughable sociopathic libertopian endeavor as well, in addition to his involvement in the laughable sociopathic Singularitarian endeavor.
No doubt he would prefer that his Ayn Raelians "Go Galt" instead in nanobotic treasure caves secreted away in the asteroid belt, but he'll have to settle for now for a li'l patch of libertarian heaven and dysentery and piracy on some crappy abandoned oil rig. Without Big Brother's prying eyes on them every minute of the day, you can be sure that the legion of soopergeniuses in the Robot Cult will be able to code that superintelligent Robot God at last, and the hott sexy slavebots, and the immortalizing shiny robot replacement bodies, and the programmable nanobotic treasure-swarms and all the rest.
Then we'll be sorry for making fun of them! Then we'll be sorry for doubting them! Then we'll be sorry for treading on them! Then we'll be sorry for our regulatory shackling of their genius and our confiscatory taxation of their bounty! Yeah, give it, er, let's see, twenty years, yeah, twenty years from now, and Libertopia will spontaneously order into Robotopia and then they'll transcend into post-humans and, and, and, oh boy, won't we be sorry then!
Although these fantasies of self-appointed sooperman sequestration are a recurring libertopian wet-dream, it is apparently an especially alluring notion now that these would-be titans and grifters fear they might actually be taxed and regulated a little in an Obama Administration (if only) thus slowing by a smidge their relentless ongoing (or at any rate pined for) looting and raping of the planet and of the overabundant majority of the people and other beings who share it with them.
You can tell these boys are serious because, among other things, they've founded an Institute. And they've published an online manifesto and FAQ. Always with the "Institutes" and "manifestos" with these boys, ain't it though?
Anyway, Patri Friedman (from neolib Milton to anarcho-capitalist David to anarcho-separatist Patri, from bloody-cuffed shirtsleeves to straightjackets in three generations) is a high muckety-muck in this endeavor. And it's interesting (I can't say it's surprising) to find Peter Thiel right at the heart of this laughable sociopathic libertopian endeavor as well, in addition to his involvement in the laughable sociopathic Singularitarian endeavor.
No doubt he would prefer that his Ayn Raelians "Go Galt" instead in nanobotic treasure caves secreted away in the asteroid belt, but he'll have to settle for now for a li'l patch of libertarian heaven and dysentery and piracy on some crappy abandoned oil rig. Without Big Brother's prying eyes on them every minute of the day, you can be sure that the legion of soopergeniuses in the Robot Cult will be able to code that superintelligent Robot God at last, and the hott sexy slavebots, and the immortalizing shiny robot replacement bodies, and the programmable nanobotic treasure-swarms and all the rest.
Then we'll be sorry for making fun of them! Then we'll be sorry for doubting them! Then we'll be sorry for treading on them! Then we'll be sorry for our regulatory shackling of their genius and our confiscatory taxation of their bounty! Yeah, give it, er, let's see, twenty years, yeah, twenty years from now, and Libertopia will spontaneously order into Robotopia and then they'll transcend into post-humans and, and, and, oh boy, won't we be sorry then!
Monday, May 18, 2009
Designs On Us: First Contentions
We have proceeded first of all under the simple assumption that design practices are always also political practices as well. This isn't a particularly controversial notion, since it is easy to show that design decisions are often driven by assumptions, values, problems that are conventionally understood as political, just as it is easy to show that design decisions inevitably have political impacts, directing resources, policing conduct, circumscribing our palpable sense of the possible and the important, and so on. Our next assumption was also straightforward, but somewhat more controversial: While it is easy to see that design both arises out of political assumptions and has manifold political impacts, we asserted as well that design typically does its political work in a mode of disavowal. The quintessential gesture of design, we said, is that of a circumvention of the political altogether, and the foregrounding of what it poses as technical questions instead.
Technical questions, questions directing themselves to instrumental prediction and control, differ from properly political ones -- among other reasons -- in that technical questions are those for which a consensus as to best means and ends either already exists or is always imagined to be achievable (provoking the aspiration for that achievement), whereas political questions are those which always attest and respond to an ineradicable diversity of stakeholders -- and thereby arise out of a diversity of judgments, desires, problems, capacities, situations -- a diversity that is interminably reconciled, always only imperfectly and contingently, all the while collaborating, contesting, and testifying in concert to that diversity. One way to get at the difference in play here is to recall that science (the quintessential technical or instrumental discourse, since it strives to substitute publicly-testable efficacy for priestly authority) aims at a valid consensus and indeed manages, if only provisionally to achieve it, whereas democratic politics (the quintessential political discourse, since it strives to substitute publicly-legible consent for elite rule) aims at a flourishing dissensus.
The word design comes from the Latin designare, which is to mark out or devise, that is to say, de- "out" conjoined to signare "to mark," derived in turn from signum, "mark" or "sign." Palpable here is the kinship of the word design with the word designate, to name or specify. Also palpable is the connection of design to the primordial cultural technology of writing, as a "marking out." Thinking both naming (designation) and making (design) through the figurative conjuration of a scene of "marking out" is richly evocative: For one thing, a clarifying (and prejudicial) association is made here between the unilateral experience of the staking out on the ground of a layout and the eventual building that arises out of this foundational marking, and a still more foundational transaction (no less unilateral) through which an abstract ideal or plan or eidos arising first in imagination is thereupon implemented in material reality. To be sure, there are other associations in play here as well in this figurative working through of a design akin to designation: To name a thing is by some reckonings to "master" it, as in the primal Adamic scene recapitulated in so much magickal as well as scientific discourse, but by others it is to circumscribe its connotations both to its cost and our own, whatever the benefits that also eventuate from it. Naming certainly has its politics, too, as we shall see especially when the politics of designating just which lives are really lives at all becomes the focus of design.
Return to Preface and Table of Contents
Go on to Next Contentions
Technical questions, questions directing themselves to instrumental prediction and control, differ from properly political ones -- among other reasons -- in that technical questions are those for which a consensus as to best means and ends either already exists or is always imagined to be achievable (provoking the aspiration for that achievement), whereas political questions are those which always attest and respond to an ineradicable diversity of stakeholders -- and thereby arise out of a diversity of judgments, desires, problems, capacities, situations -- a diversity that is interminably reconciled, always only imperfectly and contingently, all the while collaborating, contesting, and testifying in concert to that diversity. One way to get at the difference in play here is to recall that science (the quintessential technical or instrumental discourse, since it strives to substitute publicly-testable efficacy for priestly authority) aims at a valid consensus and indeed manages, if only provisionally to achieve it, whereas democratic politics (the quintessential political discourse, since it strives to substitute publicly-legible consent for elite rule) aims at a flourishing dissensus.
The word design comes from the Latin designare, which is to mark out or devise, that is to say, de- "out" conjoined to signare "to mark," derived in turn from signum, "mark" or "sign." Palpable here is the kinship of the word design with the word designate, to name or specify. Also palpable is the connection of design to the primordial cultural technology of writing, as a "marking out." Thinking both naming (designation) and making (design) through the figurative conjuration of a scene of "marking out" is richly evocative: For one thing, a clarifying (and prejudicial) association is made here between the unilateral experience of the staking out on the ground of a layout and the eventual building that arises out of this foundational marking, and a still more foundational transaction (no less unilateral) through which an abstract ideal or plan or eidos arising first in imagination is thereupon implemented in material reality. To be sure, there are other associations in play here as well in this figurative working through of a design akin to designation: To name a thing is by some reckonings to "master" it, as in the primal Adamic scene recapitulated in so much magickal as well as scientific discourse, but by others it is to circumscribe its connotations both to its cost and our own, whatever the benefits that also eventuate from it. Naming certainly has its politics, too, as we shall see especially when the politics of designating just which lives are really lives at all becomes the focus of design.
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Sunday, May 17, 2009
Designs On Us: Some Basic Contentions on the Politics of Design
The following contentions are offered up by way of a summary and a conclusion for the community of my graduate seminar "Design for Living," which took place in the Spring term of 2009 at the San Francisco Art Institute. Each contention summarizes a recurring theme or problematic or author that especially preoccupied our attention over the course of the term.
We find ourselves in a world we make, and find that we are made and unmade in the making of it. What are we to make of the abiding artifice, the polis, that sustains "the political"? What are we doing when we are doing design and what do we do when we discern that design has designs on us?
Here we will think about design as a site through which politics are done, but typically done by way of the gesture of a circumvention of the political. At the heart of this disavowed doing of politics we will contend with a perverse conjuration of "the future." The Good Life for biopolitical moderns contending in the world in the aftermath of "The Social Question" is a life with a future, and it is to "the future" that design devotes its politicity. The human species, that fantastic figure of the humanist imaginary, that Good Life that pretends to be Just Life, that universality that never arrives and always excludes, has a future, too, and its City is the one that demands design most of all.
We will direct our attention to the reiterated gesture of a futurological de-politicization of political aspiration through the figure of design, especially as this gesture articulates three urgent contemporary design discourses: First, a design discourse that would achieve sustainability (and ultimately secure social justice) through Green design; a Second design discourse that would deepen democracy through social software coding; and a Third design discourse that would achieve human equity (and ultimately a parochial vision of "optimality" misconstrued as liberation) through a eugenic policing of lifeway diversity.
In summary, we will note the regularity with which [1] the typically de-politicizing gesture of design tends to underwrite actually conservative endorsements of the status quo and the politics of incumbency; [2] any embrace of the typically unilateral implementation of design tends to underwrite anti-democratic circumventions of stakeholder politics among an ineradicable diversity of peers with whom we share the world; [3] identification in the present with "the futures" typical of design tends to be purchased at the cost of a reactionary dis-identification with the diversity of one's peers and the open futurity of politics arising out of that diversity in the present; [4] typically, the rhetorical motor of design's futurisms tends to involve a divestment of freedom of its lived worldly substance through a reductive instrumentalization then compensated for by authoritarian wish-fulfillment fantasies of hyperbolically amplified instrumental powers misconstrued as freedom and sold, incoherently, as earthly deification.
We have proceeded first of all under the simple assumption that design practices are always also political practices as well. This isn't a particularly controversial notion, since it is easy to show that design decisions are often driven by assumptions, values, problems that are conventionally understood as political, just as it is easy to show that design decisions inevitably have political impacts, directing resources, policing conduct, circumscribing our palpable sense of the possible and the important, and so on. Our next assumption was also straightforward, but somewhat more controversial: While it is easy to see that design both arises out of political assumptions and has manifold political impacts, we asserted as well that design typically does its political work in a mode of disavowal. The quintessential gesture of design, we said, is that of a circumvention of the political altogether, and the foregrounding of what it poses as technical questions instead.
Technical questions, questions directing themselves to instrumental prediction and control, differ from properly political ones -- among other reasons -- in that technical questions are those for which a consensus as to best means and ends either already exists or is always imagined to be achievable (provoking the aspiration for that achievement), whereas political questions are those which always attest and respond to an ineradicable diversity of stakeholders -- and thereby arise out of a diversity of judgments, desires, problems, capacities, situations -- a diversity that is interminably reconciled, always only imperfectly and contingently, all the while collaborating, contesting, and testifying in concert to that diversity. One way to get at the difference in play here is to recall that science (the quintessential technical or instrumental discourse, since it strives to substitute publicly-testable efficacy for priestly authority) aims at a valid consensus and indeed manages, if only provisionally to achieve it, whereas democratic politics (the quintessential political discourse, since it strives to substitute publicly-legible consent for elite rule) aims at a flourishing dissensus.
The word design comes from the Latin designare, which is to mark out or devise, that is to say, de- "out" conjoined to signare "to mark," derived in turn from signum, "mark" or "sign." Palpable here is the kinship of the word design with the word designate, to name or specify. Also palpable is the connection of design to the primordial cultural technology of writing, as a "marking out." Thinking both naming (designation) and making (design) through the figurative conjuration of a scene of "marking out" is richly evocative: For one thing, a clarifying (and prejudicial) association is made here between the unilateral experience of the staking out on the ground of a layout and the eventual building that arises out of this foundational marking, and a still more foundational transaction (no less unilateral) through which an abstract ideal or plan or eidos arising first in imagination is thereupon implemented in material reality. To be sure, there are other associations in play here as well in this figurative working through of a design akin to designation: To name a thing is by some reckonings to "master" it, as in the primal Adamic scene recapitulated in so much magickal as well as scientific discourse, but by others it is to circumscribe its connotations both to its cost and our own, whatever the benefits that also eventuate from it. Naming certainly has its politics, too, as we shall see especially when the politics of designating just which lives are really lives at all becomes the focus of design.
We find ourselves in a world we make, and find that we are made and unmade in the making of it. What are we to make of the abiding artifice, the polis, that sustains "the political"? What are we doing when we are doing design and what do we do when we discern that design has designs on us?
Here we will think about design as a site through which politics are done, but typically done by way of the gesture of a circumvention of the political. At the heart of this disavowed doing of politics we will contend with a perverse conjuration of "the future." The Good Life for biopolitical moderns contending in the world in the aftermath of "The Social Question" is a life with a future, and it is to "the future" that design devotes its politicity. The human species, that fantastic figure of the humanist imaginary, that Good Life that pretends to be Just Life, that universality that never arrives and always excludes, has a future, too, and its City is the one that demands design most of all.
We will direct our attention to the reiterated gesture of a futurological de-politicization of political aspiration through the figure of design, especially as this gesture articulates three urgent contemporary design discourses: First, a design discourse that would achieve sustainability (and ultimately secure social justice) through Green design; a Second design discourse that would deepen democracy through social software coding; and a Third design discourse that would achieve human equity (and ultimately a parochial vision of "optimality" misconstrued as liberation) through a eugenic policing of lifeway diversity.
In summary, we will note the regularity with which [1] the typically de-politicizing gesture of design tends to underwrite actually conservative endorsements of the status quo and the politics of incumbency; [2] any embrace of the typically unilateral implementation of design tends to underwrite anti-democratic circumventions of stakeholder politics among an ineradicable diversity of peers with whom we share the world; [3] identification in the present with "the futures" typical of design tends to be purchased at the cost of a reactionary dis-identification with the diversity of one's peers and the open futurity of politics arising out of that diversity in the present; [4] typically, the rhetorical motor of design's futurisms tends to involve a divestment of freedom of its lived worldly substance through a reductive instrumentalization then compensated for by authoritarian wish-fulfillment fantasies of hyperbolically amplified instrumental powers misconstrued as freedom and sold, incoherently, as earthly deification.
We have proceeded first of all under the simple assumption that design practices are always also political practices as well. This isn't a particularly controversial notion, since it is easy to show that design decisions are often driven by assumptions, values, problems that are conventionally understood as political, just as it is easy to show that design decisions inevitably have political impacts, directing resources, policing conduct, circumscribing our palpable sense of the possible and the important, and so on. Our next assumption was also straightforward, but somewhat more controversial: While it is easy to see that design both arises out of political assumptions and has manifold political impacts, we asserted as well that design typically does its political work in a mode of disavowal. The quintessential gesture of design, we said, is that of a circumvention of the political altogether, and the foregrounding of what it poses as technical questions instead.
Technical questions, questions directing themselves to instrumental prediction and control, differ from properly political ones -- among other reasons -- in that technical questions are those for which a consensus as to best means and ends either already exists or is always imagined to be achievable (provoking the aspiration for that achievement), whereas political questions are those which always attest and respond to an ineradicable diversity of stakeholders -- and thereby arise out of a diversity of judgments, desires, problems, capacities, situations -- a diversity that is interminably reconciled, always only imperfectly and contingently, all the while collaborating, contesting, and testifying in concert to that diversity. One way to get at the difference in play here is to recall that science (the quintessential technical or instrumental discourse, since it strives to substitute publicly-testable efficacy for priestly authority) aims at a valid consensus and indeed manages, if only provisionally to achieve it, whereas democratic politics (the quintessential political discourse, since it strives to substitute publicly-legible consent for elite rule) aims at a flourishing dissensus.
The word design comes from the Latin designare, which is to mark out or devise, that is to say, de- "out" conjoined to signare "to mark," derived in turn from signum, "mark" or "sign." Palpable here is the kinship of the word design with the word designate, to name or specify. Also palpable is the connection of design to the primordial cultural technology of writing, as a "marking out." Thinking both naming (designation) and making (design) through the figurative conjuration of a scene of "marking out" is richly evocative: For one thing, a clarifying (and prejudicial) association is made here between the unilateral experience of the staking out on the ground of a layout and the eventual building that arises out of this foundational marking, and a still more foundational transaction (no less unilateral) through which an abstract ideal or plan or eidos arising first in imagination is thereupon implemented in material reality. To be sure, there are other associations in play here as well in this figurative working through of a design akin to designation: To name a thing is by some reckonings to "master" it, as in the primal Adamic scene recapitulated in so much magickal as well as scientific discourse, but by others it is to circumscribe its connotations both to its cost and our own, whatever the benefits that also eventuate from it. Naming certainly has its politics, too, as we shall see especially when the politics of designating just which lives are really lives at all becomes the focus of design.
Monday, May 04, 2009
Ridiculing the Ridiculous
Giulio Prisco has called me out again on his blog, and has accused me (not for the first time, probably not for the thousandth time) of name-calling without any substance and then accuses me of being a "bioluddite." I leave the delineation of the self-referential hilarities of this gambit as an exercise for the reader.
On a side note, compare Singularitarian Ben Goertzel's assessment of the post and thread in question, "bizarrely retarded luddite ranting," where again from the vantage of superlativity it seems apt to decry demurral from membership in the Robot Cult as tantamount to luddism, despite pesky little things like, you know, the actual history of the term, the actual meaning of words, and the actual views that tend to be espoused by those who presently take up that term -- I suppose, John Zerzan? Kirkpatrick Sale? -- with which I importantly disagree. I do wonder how many champions of consensus science, boosters of medical r & d funding, accountability, and science education, and advocates of informed, nonduressed consensual prosthetic self-determination, whether it is normativizing or not, throng the ranks of "the bioluddites" after all?
In any case, here is my response to His High Holy Pontifex of the Order of Cosmic Engineers, Robot Cultist Giulio Prisco, of whom I expect Ben Goertzel approves far more than he does the likes of me:
Transhumanism is a discourse, and so it can be analyzed as a discourse; transhumanism is a movement, self-described, with members, self-identified, and so it can be analyzed as a movement. Any criticism at the level of generality of the discourse or the movement you disapprove of you then declare to be defamation of individuals because each individual differs (obviously, however minutely) in her deployment of the discourse and in her affiliation as a member.
But that’s not the way it works. In deploying the discourse, in assuming the membership you open yourself to scrutiny vis-a-vis the general discourse, as a self-identified member of the movement or sub(cult)ure -- just as, presumably, you gain the unique pleasures of that deployment and membership that attract you to it -- just as, in publishing opinions you open yourself to critical scrutiny.
When a discourse with which you are affiliated -- especially a marginal one you assume very conspicuously by choice -- is criticized you should first determine if the shoe fits and then, if it does, wear it or not, but if you find the criticism inapplicable to you the question remains whether or not it is applicable more generally and if it is whether your own disapproval of it creates a special obligation for you resist it as someone who still affirms the affiliation despite the disagreement.
As anybody with the meanest intelligence who reads my critique will discover soon enough, I argue not that all transhumanist-identified individuals (most of whom I don’t know after all, and few of whom I know at all well) are explicitly fulminating Nazis but simply that there is a structural endorsement of parochial visions of optimality that trump consent in “enhancement” discourses like transhumanism, sometimes against the grain of actually expressed convictions (which can mean hypocrisy, incomprehension, skewed priorities, any number of things), and also that the True Believer/Would-be Authority circuit most pronounced in cult formations is also exhibited in marginal and hence defensive transhumanist sub(cult)ure, as a movement defined by affiliation based less on arguments than on shared identification with idealized and marginal technodevelopmental outcomes (and you can whine all you want, the distinctive views and aspirations of transhumanism are indeed flabbergastingly marginal from scientific consensus and mainstream progressivity, and that marginality is a factual question for which the evidences are legion).
I think superlative futurology is ridiculous and dangerous and symptomatic and all that shows in my writing about it and I cheerfully stand by that. I don’t mince words nor do I dissemble my views. I’m not trying to persuade you, Giulio, heaven knows, because it is my honest assessment after literally years and years of sparring with you, that you are unavailable to such persuasion. Instead, not to put too fine a point on it, I’m trying to expose you, and thereby to warn others from being taken in, so as to limit the very real damage I think you do to sensible public technodevelopmental deliberation at the worst possible historical moment.
You needn’t worry, I don’t feel particularly “insulted” by your clumsy misapplication of the term "bioluddite" to me -- I am simply pointing to the obvious stupidity of the assignment, given the things words actually mean, the histories and dispute actually in play around such designations, and given my positions on relevant issues actually easily available to be read by anybody who cares to do.
I eagerly await your scintillating reply. Some variation of I know you are but what am I usually seems to suit you. Go with what you know.
Sunday, May 03, 2009
Arendt, Fanon, King on Violence
Upgraded and adapted from an exchage with "Kate" in the Moot:
You wonder:
Much more substantially, King later declares that it can be just as much a demonstration of one's fidelity to the rule of law to violate the letter of the unjust law in the full expectation that one will suffer the unjust penalty for that violation as to obey the letter of the just law in the full expectation that one will escape any unjust penalty thereby.
Is King an "outside agitator" or one of "we the people"? Do his action violate community rules or appeal to the Constitution? Are the judgements to which he testifies, the deeds to which he is committed making the world more deranged or more capacious, more brittle or more enduring? What matters about King's declaration is that in judging the law unjust and soliciting its unjust penalty through a violation, one expects to expose its injustice and so contribute to its improvement. But one cannot ever actually know whether or not one's judgments in these matters are indeed the right ones or whether this strategy is one that will vindicate your judgment or rewrite the law in your own image of its more perfect justice.
It may be that your violation is judged as a violence and its punishment just and the letter of the law will be consolidated in the image of injustice by your lights. This is especially true in the sorts of struggles King is writing about, in which, as he also says in the Letter, it is so easy to mistake the exposure of social violence (through demonstrations and civil disobedience, say) as the commission of social violence (undermining conventional mores, disrupting public order, fomenting unrest, say). And so, as you say:
But again, the lack of a palpable guarantor that one's judgment will be endorsed, that one's resistance will succeed in re-enacting the rule of law differently is inescapable, since these are political phenomena we are talking about, phenomena arising out of and in the midst of the ineradicable diversity of the peers with whom we collaboratively and antagonistically share and substantiate and change the world, peer to peer.
This is the risk of the political as such, the register of its freedom. It is a mark of this very risk that while King is canonized as a prophet of nonviolence Fanon is often viewed as a glorifier of violence, despite the fact that it is the historical conditions into which they would intervene that distinguished them most in many cases, while their radicalism reveals profound continuities (of course the domestication of King's radicalism by way of his distorted mainstream canonization in the US is part of this story).
All of this provides some context explaining why for Arendt political judgment is illuminated by reference to aesthetic judgment: we release meaningful and beautiful forms into the world, we assess forms as meaningful and beautiful, and in so doing we offer up our judgments to the tribunal of public assessment. That the aesthetic object or event is valu-able is objective and universal, that it is valu-ed is subjective and contingent. Of course, like all universals, the valu-able will always be exposed retroactively as contingent, as human beings are not gods, but its distinctive force is aspirational. To be judged as valu-able is always to be offered up as a candidate for enduring value, that value making and partaking of the world that exceeds us, while to be attested to as value-ed is a measure of the worldly pleasures afforded by and within that durable excess.
In offering up the judgment -- or our political opinions -- to the hearing of our peers and owning up to it we engage in a transaction in which we are substantiated (even if our judgments are not always so substantiated) as judges, as agents, as peers among peers, as worldly worldmakers, an experience of freedom (the Founding Fathers described this experience as "public happiness") we cannot produce on our own, on which we depend on the presence of a diversity of others. It is crucial to grasp that politics so construed is the opposite of violence -- indeed, Arendt describes "nonviolent politics" as a redundant expression.
While it is true that Arendt is one who declares Fanon to be glorifying violence in her "Reflections on Violence" -- albeit recognizing the sophistication of his case and the circumstances that probably justify his acceptance of violence in the colonial instance -- it seems to me her understanding of the political provides one of the best ways of grasping the significance of Fanon's project as an emancipatory one. It is one of the great frustrations of reading Arendt that she did not seem to recognize the kinship between the anti-colonial struggles testified to by Fanon and the anti-Nazi struggles of the French Resistance she celebrates so forcefully in the preface of Between Past and Future, and that she did not fully connect the racism she examines in the Antisemitism volume of The Origins of Totalitarianism with the American racism she treats with terrible clumsiness amidst the insights in her "Reflections on Little Rock" and elsewhere.
Are you saying that in order to be remembered in the future as having made some kind of progress towards "peace" one must occasionally resort to violence, or that in some cases the only way to make any kind of difference in the direction of peace one must occasionally resort to acts of violence that might put them in an unfavorable light in future historical lenses?It is obviously true that sometimes people make recourse to violence because they see no alternative, and it is true that in retrospect such rationales are sometimes accepted as justifications and sometimes they are not, just as it is also true that sometimes efforts at nonviolent resistance fail either to accomplish their ends or even fail to be accepted in retrospect as nonviolent at all (they are remembered as disturbances of the peace, they are associated with incidental property crimes, and so on). The only generalization I have proposed so far suggests very much the contrary sort of principle, namely, that the resort to violence always unleashes forces at least as bad as the ones it would combat.
You wonder:
when someone in such a situation would know that the only recourse left is violence?The crucial thing to grasp is that you cannot know. Think about King's "Letter from Birmingham City Jail." The bumper sticker people tend to take from that piece is that "Injustice Anywhere Is Injustice Everywhere," as though King is proposing that we already know of what justice consists in all its instances. Of course, reading the text itself we realize that this particular sentence arises in the context of a dispute, not at all a universally accepted assertion, between King and the "dear fellow clergymen" whose editorial he directly addresses in the Letter, a dispute in which the question at hand is what does it mean to describe somebody as an "outside agitator" in a world of complex mutualities.
Much more substantially, King later declares that it can be just as much a demonstration of one's fidelity to the rule of law to violate the letter of the unjust law in the full expectation that one will suffer the unjust penalty for that violation as to obey the letter of the just law in the full expectation that one will escape any unjust penalty thereby.
Is King an "outside agitator" or one of "we the people"? Do his action violate community rules or appeal to the Constitution? Are the judgements to which he testifies, the deeds to which he is committed making the world more deranged or more capacious, more brittle or more enduring? What matters about King's declaration is that in judging the law unjust and soliciting its unjust penalty through a violation, one expects to expose its injustice and so contribute to its improvement. But one cannot ever actually know whether or not one's judgments in these matters are indeed the right ones or whether this strategy is one that will vindicate your judgment or rewrite the law in your own image of its more perfect justice.
It may be that your violation is judged as a violence and its punishment just and the letter of the law will be consolidated in the image of injustice by your lights. This is especially true in the sorts of struggles King is writing about, in which, as he also says in the Letter, it is so easy to mistake the exposure of social violence (through demonstrations and civil disobedience, say) as the commission of social violence (undermining conventional mores, disrupting public order, fomenting unrest, say). And so, as you say:
[T]here's no clear event or moment at which attempts at peaceful reconciliation is beyond possibility, when violent action is the only way to bring about change (which obviously won't in any way assure peaceful change). Isn't that how oppressors manage to keep the victim group in a disadvantaged place for interminable amounts of time -- by claiming that change must come slowly and peacefully?That's right. King pointed out that the privileged rarely relinquish even their unjust privileges voluntarily, and hence pleas for moderation (nonviolent resistance is not, in its nonviolence, also automatically "moderate") often amount to de facto endorsements and enforcements of the unjust status quo, whatever the expressed convictions of the "moderators" toward the unjust realities at hand.
But again, the lack of a palpable guarantor that one's judgment will be endorsed, that one's resistance will succeed in re-enacting the rule of law differently is inescapable, since these are political phenomena we are talking about, phenomena arising out of and in the midst of the ineradicable diversity of the peers with whom we collaboratively and antagonistically share and substantiate and change the world, peer to peer.
This is the risk of the political as such, the register of its freedom. It is a mark of this very risk that while King is canonized as a prophet of nonviolence Fanon is often viewed as a glorifier of violence, despite the fact that it is the historical conditions into which they would intervene that distinguished them most in many cases, while their radicalism reveals profound continuities (of course the domestication of King's radicalism by way of his distorted mainstream canonization in the US is part of this story).
All of this provides some context explaining why for Arendt political judgment is illuminated by reference to aesthetic judgment: we release meaningful and beautiful forms into the world, we assess forms as meaningful and beautiful, and in so doing we offer up our judgments to the tribunal of public assessment. That the aesthetic object or event is valu-able is objective and universal, that it is valu-ed is subjective and contingent. Of course, like all universals, the valu-able will always be exposed retroactively as contingent, as human beings are not gods, but its distinctive force is aspirational. To be judged as valu-able is always to be offered up as a candidate for enduring value, that value making and partaking of the world that exceeds us, while to be attested to as value-ed is a measure of the worldly pleasures afforded by and within that durable excess.
In offering up the judgment -- or our political opinions -- to the hearing of our peers and owning up to it we engage in a transaction in which we are substantiated (even if our judgments are not always so substantiated) as judges, as agents, as peers among peers, as worldly worldmakers, an experience of freedom (the Founding Fathers described this experience as "public happiness") we cannot produce on our own, on which we depend on the presence of a diversity of others. It is crucial to grasp that politics so construed is the opposite of violence -- indeed, Arendt describes "nonviolent politics" as a redundant expression.
I read... that some people interpreted [Fanon's] text as saying that the only effective means of change was violence, but I also heard that this interpretation was in part due to Sartre's rather passionate introduction to the book, that it was Sartre who was advocating violence, not Fanon. Also, didn't Arendt promptly write a counter-argument to that section of the book?I definitely do not agree that Fanon is making an argument that the only effective means of change arises from violence in some general way. I think that even when he is backed up against the wall and argues that violence is justified by the ubiquitous inescapable violence of organized criminality in colonial administration based on the "irrational rationality" of racist pseudo-science, he also knows that the "effectiveness" of this means is profoundly undermined by the afterlife of violence in the new order it would establish and also he pines quite clearly in "Concerning Violence" but even more stunningly in Black Skin, White Masks for the life-giving world-building practice of politics, peer to peer, in terms very close indeed to Arendt's own.
While it is true that Arendt is one who declares Fanon to be glorifying violence in her "Reflections on Violence" -- albeit recognizing the sophistication of his case and the circumstances that probably justify his acceptance of violence in the colonial instance -- it seems to me her understanding of the political provides one of the best ways of grasping the significance of Fanon's project as an emancipatory one. It is one of the great frustrations of reading Arendt that she did not seem to recognize the kinship between the anti-colonial struggles testified to by Fanon and the anti-Nazi struggles of the French Resistance she celebrates so forcefully in the preface of Between Past and Future, and that she did not fully connect the racism she examines in the Antisemitism volume of The Origins of Totalitarianism with the American racism she treats with terrible clumsiness amidst the insights in her "Reflections on Little Rock" and elsewhere.
Saturday, May 02, 2009
More On Violence
Upgraded and adapted from the Moot, an exchange with "Seth":
Well, this is politics we are talking about and so one can never say never when all is said and done... But, as far as it goes, yeah, I do think it is pretty overwhelmingly generally true that violent revolution unleashes forces as bad as the ones it would address.
This is not to say that this means that there actually always will be nonviolent alternatives available -- the organized criminality of Nazi totalitarianism as discussed by Arendt in "Moral Responsibility Under Dictatorship" and the organized criminality of colonialism as discussed by Fanon in "Concerning Violence" in Wretched of the Earth both seem to demonstrate that violent revolution indeed can be justified.
But it is crucial to note that this justification does not circumvent the recognition by either Arendt or Fanon that this justified violence nonetheless unleashes forces as bad as the ones it would combat. It's just that for those caught up in that organized violence, the exchange of one evil for another is literally the only available route into history. No reasonable or ethical person under any circumstances but those would ever affirm the evil of violence once they understood this reality.
These circumstances of organized criminality differ in kind from the evils confronted even by King in the segregated South, even by those who suffered under the flabbergasting dictatorship of Stalin, or who suffer and die now from neoliberal precarization in a planet of slums (as described so well by Mike Davis among other). This is absolutely not to diminish the suffering or horror of the latter forms of violence and exploitation as against the former, but to grasp structural differences in the organization of these horrors that impact the resistances actually available in the face of their evil.
Me, too.
You can be sure that it does and it will. Plurality is the occasion of the political, unpredictability the ineradicable price of its freedom. Still, the general principle that violence unleashes forces at least as bad as the ones it would combat remains both profound and very useful to remember when the chips are down and to weave as deeply as may be into one's personal practice, even, or especially, when it seems difficult, all the same. At any rate, that's my personal call.
Dale, when you say that "Violent revolution unleashes forces as bad as the ones it would address," do you see that as being always true?
Well, this is politics we are talking about and so one can never say never when all is said and done... But, as far as it goes, yeah, I do think it is pretty overwhelmingly generally true that violent revolution unleashes forces as bad as the ones it would address.
This is not to say that this means that there actually always will be nonviolent alternatives available -- the organized criminality of Nazi totalitarianism as discussed by Arendt in "Moral Responsibility Under Dictatorship" and the organized criminality of colonialism as discussed by Fanon in "Concerning Violence" in Wretched of the Earth both seem to demonstrate that violent revolution indeed can be justified.
But it is crucial to note that this justification does not circumvent the recognition by either Arendt or Fanon that this justified violence nonetheless unleashes forces as bad as the ones it would combat. It's just that for those caught up in that organized violence, the exchange of one evil for another is literally the only available route into history. No reasonable or ethical person under any circumstances but those would ever affirm the evil of violence once they understood this reality.
These circumstances of organized criminality differ in kind from the evils confronted even by King in the segregated South, even by those who suffered under the flabbergasting dictatorship of Stalin, or who suffer and die now from neoliberal precarization in a planet of slums (as described so well by Mike Davis among other). This is absolutely not to diminish the suffering or horror of the latter forms of violence and exploitation as against the former, but to grasp structural differences in the organization of these horrors that impact the resistances actually available in the face of their evil.
I agree that in this context, "progressive reform is all that remains [and] it is pointless to contemplate whether or not it is 'adequate' to the weight of incumbency and injustice," and I think that this perspective offers a way out of many forms of political apathy, and undermines many tendencies toward the fetishization of one's politics, and the consequent fracturing of the power that's available to be taken up in the space between people.
Me, too.
But couldn't that formulation, conceivably at least, measure out differently in a different place, or even here at a different time?
You can be sure that it does and it will. Plurality is the occasion of the political, unpredictability the ineradicable price of its freedom. Still, the general principle that violence unleashes forces at least as bad as the ones it would combat remains both profound and very useful to remember when the chips are down and to weave as deeply as may be into one's personal practice, even, or especially, when it seems difficult, all the same. At any rate, that's my personal call.
Wednesday, April 29, 2009
Superlative Strategery
STEP ONE: Read science fiction.
STEP TWO: Circle-Wank.
STEP THREE: Techno-heaven!
STEP TWO: Circle-Wank.
STEP THREE: Techno-heaven!
Tuesday, April 28, 2009
More Reductionism
Upgraded and adapted from the Moot:
The repudiation of reductionism in the sense I mean is not an embrace of supernaturalism but a simple reminder that one cannot derive ought from is, coupled with the reminder -- unfortunately, less widely affirmed but quite as crucial -- that oughts are nonetheless indispensable to human flourishing.
That life, intelligence, freedom are not supernatural but natural phenomena suggests that they are, indeed, susceptible, in principle, of natural analysis. But this is certainly no justification for treating our own conspicuously preliminary empirical understandings of life, intelligence, freedom -- or, better yet, essentially figurative formulations that scarcely even pretend to factuality (or consensus, whatever futurological protests to the contrary) except to their faithful -- as already adequate to these phenomena when they palpably are not adequate, just because it is not logically impossible that eventual understanding may become adequate.
The repudiation of reductionism in the sense I mean is not an embrace of supernaturalism but a simple reminder that one cannot derive ought from is, coupled with the reminder -- unfortunately, less widely affirmed but quite as crucial -- that oughts are nonetheless indispensable to human flourishing.
That life, intelligence, freedom are not supernatural but natural phenomena suggests that they are, indeed, susceptible, in principle, of natural analysis. But this is certainly no justification for treating our own conspicuously preliminary empirical understandings of life, intelligence, freedom -- or, better yet, essentially figurative formulations that scarcely even pretend to factuality (or consensus, whatever futurological protests to the contrary) except to their faithful -- as already adequate to these phenomena when they palpably are not adequate, just because it is not logically impossible that eventual understanding may become adequate.
Superlatvity Exposed
Upgraded and adapted from the Moot:
I hate to break it to you but these figures Kurzweil, Drexler, Moravek, even enormously likable fellows like de Grey (and don't even get me started on that atrocity exhibition Yudkowsky) and so on you like to cite as your authorities are quite simply not taken seriously outside the small circle of superlative futurology itself -- at least not for the claims you are investing with superlative-endorsing significance.
Scientists rightly and reasonably cherish outliers, they benefit from provocation, and at their best will give a serious hearing to the extraordinary so long as it aspires to scientificity -- but there is a difference between this appreciation and the actual achievement of the standard of scientific consensus, just as there is a difference between the achievement of a popular bestseller and that of passing muster as science.
Ever heard of a citation index? You claim to care about facts above all. Well, citation indexes tell a story about the relation of superlativity to scientific consensus that there is no denying if you are truly the reality-based person you want to sell yourself as.
You can't claim at once to be a paragon of science while eschewing its standards.
You simply can't.
You keep trying to divert these discussions of the conceptual difficulties and figurative entailments of your futurological discourse into superficially "technical" discussions about superficially predictive "differences of opinion" about trumped up technodevelopmental timelines -- but you have not earned the right to be treated as somebody having a technical or predictive discussion in these matters.
No developmental "timeline" will spit out the ponies you are looking for at the end of the rainbow. This isn't a question of "predictions."
Pining for an escape from error-proneness, weakness, or mortality isn't the same thing as debating how best to land a rocket on the Moon or cure polio.
I am a teacher of aesthetic and political theory in the academy, precisley the sort of person many superlative futurologists like to deride as a muzzy effete fashionably-nonsensical relativist, but I am for all that a champion of consensus science, a champion of more public funding for research and more public science education, and as a proper champion of consensus science I am the one who tells you that consensus science is no ally to Robot Cultism, no ally of yours.
The proper questions provoked by the phenomena of superlative futurology are: just what renders the aspirations to superintelligence, superlongevity, and superabundance so desirable and so plausible to those who are personally invested in superlative futurological sub(cult)ures organized by shared desire for and faith in these transcendentalizing aspirations?
Turning to these questions one no longer participates in any of the preferred topics that preoccupy the Robot Cultists themselves, who like to treat pseudo-science and superficially scientific forms as shared public rituals, the indulgence in which substantiates in the present the reality effect of their wish-fulfillment fantasies about "The Future," so-called. No, when we treat superlativity as it is, as a narrative genre and a faithful sub(cult)ure, then quickly and quite properly the discussion instead turns terminological, discursive, literary, psychological, ethnographic.
It is no wonder that so many would-be superlative futurologists, as the pseudo-scientists they are, so disdain the thinking of humanities scholarship, which -- while it is indeed non-scientific is not ultimately anti-scientific like their own tends to be -- is precisely the most relevant and capable of exposing them for what they are.
I hate to break it to you but these figures Kurzweil, Drexler, Moravek, even enormously likable fellows like de Grey (and don't even get me started on that atrocity exhibition Yudkowsky) and so on you like to cite as your authorities are quite simply not taken seriously outside the small circle of superlative futurology itself -- at least not for the claims you are investing with superlative-endorsing significance.
Scientists rightly and reasonably cherish outliers, they benefit from provocation, and at their best will give a serious hearing to the extraordinary so long as it aspires to scientificity -- but there is a difference between this appreciation and the actual achievement of the standard of scientific consensus, just as there is a difference between the achievement of a popular bestseller and that of passing muster as science.
Ever heard of a citation index? You claim to care about facts above all. Well, citation indexes tell a story about the relation of superlativity to scientific consensus that there is no denying if you are truly the reality-based person you want to sell yourself as.
You can't claim at once to be a paragon of science while eschewing its standards.
You simply can't.
You keep trying to divert these discussions of the conceptual difficulties and figurative entailments of your futurological discourse into superficially "technical" discussions about superficially predictive "differences of opinion" about trumped up technodevelopmental timelines -- but you have not earned the right to be treated as somebody having a technical or predictive discussion in these matters.
No developmental "timeline" will spit out the ponies you are looking for at the end of the rainbow. This isn't a question of "predictions."
Pining for an escape from error-proneness, weakness, or mortality isn't the same thing as debating how best to land a rocket on the Moon or cure polio.
I am a teacher of aesthetic and political theory in the academy, precisley the sort of person many superlative futurologists like to deride as a muzzy effete fashionably-nonsensical relativist, but I am for all that a champion of consensus science, a champion of more public funding for research and more public science education, and as a proper champion of consensus science I am the one who tells you that consensus science is no ally to Robot Cultism, no ally of yours.
The proper questions provoked by the phenomena of superlative futurology are: just what renders the aspirations to superintelligence, superlongevity, and superabundance so desirable and so plausible to those who are personally invested in superlative futurological sub(cult)ures organized by shared desire for and faith in these transcendentalizing aspirations?
Turning to these questions one no longer participates in any of the preferred topics that preoccupy the Robot Cultists themselves, who like to treat pseudo-science and superficially scientific forms as shared public rituals, the indulgence in which substantiates in the present the reality effect of their wish-fulfillment fantasies about "The Future," so-called. No, when we treat superlativity as it is, as a narrative genre and a faithful sub(cult)ure, then quickly and quite properly the discussion instead turns terminological, discursive, literary, psychological, ethnographic.
It is no wonder that so many would-be superlative futurologists, as the pseudo-scientists they are, so disdain the thinking of humanities scholarship, which -- while it is indeed non-scientific is not ultimately anti-scientific like their own tends to be -- is precisely the most relevant and capable of exposing them for what they are.
Saturday, April 25, 2009
No, You're the Cultist!
Upgraded and adapted from the Moot: "Extropia" declares me to be no different from a fulminating Creationist in my assessment that the curious claims of the Robot Cultists are faith-based in their essence. He declares the very confidence of my belief to reveal me to be the True Cultist. From inside the charmed circle of True Belief, glimpses of the outside world seem to get a bit... skewed sometimes, don't they, though?
As it happens, I don't claim to be completely correct in any aspect of my life, I'm not that sort of person at all. I'm a pragmatist by conviction and temperament both, and have no truck with certainties. I do hold strong opinions and delight in testifying to them and am well pleased to own up to the consequences. That is the substance of freedom in my view.
Among these opinions of mine, I am quite confident in declaring Robot Cultism to be a constellation of faith-based initiatives connected in only the most superficial way to the secular democracy of sensible educated enlightened people. The various branches of superlative futurology and their organizational life in the various Robot Cults are marginal both to consensus science and to prevailing progressivity.
Do I need to recite those views of the Robot Cultists again for the peanut gallery, by the way? The preoccupation with "migrating" organismic intelligence into cyberspace? Thereby to "immortalize" or super-longevize it? And so to "live" on in a virtual or nanobotic-slave Heaven? All under the beneficent eye of a history-shattering superintelligent Robot God?
Deny the obvious marginality of these beliefs all you want, you simply expose yourself instantly thereby as a loon (though the beliefs themselves have gone a long way in preparing us for that possibility already). No "arguments" are necessary on this score and, indeed, to indulge them at this level is actually to concede you ground you could not earn on your own crazy terms.
Once we are clear that it is you who are making the extraordinary claims (and, to be fair, I'll cheerfully concede and celebrate that extraordinary claims have often contributed their measure to human progress and delight, especially as aesthetic matters) then we should be agreed that yours are not the terms that define these debates, it is the skeptics you need to convince on terms intelligible to us, with evidences that pass muster on the terms of consensus science, with patient elaborations rather than impatient declarations of your self-evident superiority and certainty despite your utter marginality.
Unfortunately, I suspect you will find that once you engage in a good-faith effort to translate your project into such terms all that will be left that compels any kind of attention will consist of fairly mainstream secular progressive support of well-funded well-regulated equitably-distributed open technoscience in the service of solving shared problems.
Nobody needs to join a Robot Cult to work on actual software security, or actual healthcare, or actual materials science. The deeper psychological and social needs that are truly the ones the Robot Cult answers to -- for the overabundant majority of its True Believers -- are just as well met by a good therapist, a big bottle, a fine book of poems, some modest non-moralizing faith-practice, a good sound occasional fuck, or what have you. As they are for the rest of us.
Hell, Robot Cultists can still indulge for aesthetic and subcultural kicks in sf fandoms and futurological daydreams for all I care (I'm a big sf geek myself after all, I get the sensawunda thing) -- they just shouldn't keep pretending and trying to sell that what they're doing is science or policy or progressive politics in any sense of the word.
Once all that is well and truly cleared up Robot Cultists are just silly people following their idiosyncratic bliss and doing nobody any harm but possibly themselves. Who cares? Let your freak flags fly, as I will mine, for all the world to see.
It is the superlative futurological derangement of public technodevelopmental deliberation, it is the anti-democratizing politics of superlative futurology, it is the deeper more prevailing anti-democratic corporate-militarist futurology the Robot Cultists symptomize in their extremity that are the real dangers and problems that interest me.
Sure, little the Robot Cultists say makes sense on its own terms, either, but that's true of lots of other people and viewpoints that I don't devote my energy to critiquing.
As it happens, I don't claim to be completely correct in any aspect of my life, I'm not that sort of person at all. I'm a pragmatist by conviction and temperament both, and have no truck with certainties. I do hold strong opinions and delight in testifying to them and am well pleased to own up to the consequences. That is the substance of freedom in my view.
Among these opinions of mine, I am quite confident in declaring Robot Cultism to be a constellation of faith-based initiatives connected in only the most superficial way to the secular democracy of sensible educated enlightened people. The various branches of superlative futurology and their organizational life in the various Robot Cults are marginal both to consensus science and to prevailing progressivity.
Do I need to recite those views of the Robot Cultists again for the peanut gallery, by the way? The preoccupation with "migrating" organismic intelligence into cyberspace? Thereby to "immortalize" or super-longevize it? And so to "live" on in a virtual or nanobotic-slave Heaven? All under the beneficent eye of a history-shattering superintelligent Robot God?
Deny the obvious marginality of these beliefs all you want, you simply expose yourself instantly thereby as a loon (though the beliefs themselves have gone a long way in preparing us for that possibility already). No "arguments" are necessary on this score and, indeed, to indulge them at this level is actually to concede you ground you could not earn on your own crazy terms.
Once we are clear that it is you who are making the extraordinary claims (and, to be fair, I'll cheerfully concede and celebrate that extraordinary claims have often contributed their measure to human progress and delight, especially as aesthetic matters) then we should be agreed that yours are not the terms that define these debates, it is the skeptics you need to convince on terms intelligible to us, with evidences that pass muster on the terms of consensus science, with patient elaborations rather than impatient declarations of your self-evident superiority and certainty despite your utter marginality.
Unfortunately, I suspect you will find that once you engage in a good-faith effort to translate your project into such terms all that will be left that compels any kind of attention will consist of fairly mainstream secular progressive support of well-funded well-regulated equitably-distributed open technoscience in the service of solving shared problems.
Nobody needs to join a Robot Cult to work on actual software security, or actual healthcare, or actual materials science. The deeper psychological and social needs that are truly the ones the Robot Cult answers to -- for the overabundant majority of its True Believers -- are just as well met by a good therapist, a big bottle, a fine book of poems, some modest non-moralizing faith-practice, a good sound occasional fuck, or what have you. As they are for the rest of us.
Hell, Robot Cultists can still indulge for aesthetic and subcultural kicks in sf fandoms and futurological daydreams for all I care (I'm a big sf geek myself after all, I get the sensawunda thing) -- they just shouldn't keep pretending and trying to sell that what they're doing is science or policy or progressive politics in any sense of the word.
Once all that is well and truly cleared up Robot Cultists are just silly people following their idiosyncratic bliss and doing nobody any harm but possibly themselves. Who cares? Let your freak flags fly, as I will mine, for all the world to see.
It is the superlative futurological derangement of public technodevelopmental deliberation, it is the anti-democratizing politics of superlative futurology, it is the deeper more prevailing anti-democratic corporate-militarist futurology the Robot Cultists symptomize in their extremity that are the real dangers and problems that interest me.
Sure, little the Robot Cultists say makes sense on its own terms, either, but that's true of lots of other people and viewpoints that I don't devote my energy to critiquing.
Monday, April 20, 2009
Hannah Arendt on AI
And now for the third and final excerpt of something like an unexpected trilogy of excerpts from Hannah Arendt today. Although this is likely to be the first many readers encounter in consequence of the chronological arrangement of posts in a blog, I do want to stress that this is the third, and in many ways least interesting, of the trilogy, an excerpt that needs the earlier two (first here and second here) to take on its real salience as a complement to what I criticize as superlative futurology. This passage appears in The Human Condition, on pp. 171-172, and nicely ties together some of the themes from the preceding discussion.
Again, we have in the reference to the "worldlessness" of instrumental calculation and its effects a unique Arendtian usage. For Arendt the "world" is profoundly political in its substance, akin to the sense in which when we speak of "worldly" concerns we often mean to indicate more than just planetary or natural concerns, but public and cultural affairs more generally. On p. 52 of The Human Condition, she writes that "the term 'public' signifies the world itself." She continues
Among other things, it seems worthwhile to draw attention to Arendt's idiosyncratic understanding of the "world" especially since this is the world the love of which Arendt announced in her personal motto, Amor Mundi. Think of the way in which we are born into a speech, a "mother tongue," the existence of which long precedes our birth and will continue on long after our death, but which, for all that still consists entirely of our own performances of it, performances that at once sustain it in its existence but also change it (through coinages, figurative deviations, and so on).
If it were true that man is an animal rationale in the sense in which the modern age understood the term, namely, an animal species which differs from other animals in that it is endowed with superior brain power, then the newly invented electronic machines, which, sometimes to the dismay and sometimes to the confusion of their inventors, are so spectacularly more "intelligent" than human beings, would indeed be homunculi. As it is, they are, like all machines, mere substitutes and artificial improvers of human labor power, following the time-honored device of all division of labor to break down every operation into its simplest constituent motions, substituting, for instance, repeated addition for multiplication. The superior power of the machine is manifest in its speed, which is far greater than that of human brain power; because of this superior speed, the machine can dispense with multiplication, which is the pre-electronic technical device to speed up addition. All that the giant computers prove is that the modern age was wrong to believe with Hobbes that rationality, in the sense of "reckoning with consequences," is the highest and most human of man's capacities, and that the life and labor philosophers, Marx or Bergson or Nietzsche, were right to see in this type of intelligence, which they mistook for reason, a mere function of the life process itself, or, as Hume put it, a mere "slave of the passions." Obviously, this brain power and the compelling logical processes it generates are not capable of erecting a world, are as worldless as the compulsory processes of life, labor, and consumption.
Again, we have in the reference to the "worldlessness" of instrumental calculation and its effects a unique Arendtian usage. For Arendt the "world" is profoundly political in its substance, akin to the sense in which when we speak of "worldly" concerns we often mean to indicate more than just planetary or natural concerns, but public and cultural affairs more generally. On p. 52 of The Human Condition, she writes that "the term 'public' signifies the world itself." She continues
This world... is not identical with the earth or with nature... It is related, rather, to the human artifact, the fabrication of human hands, as well as to affairs which go on among those who inhabit the man-made world together [emphasis added --d]. To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it common, as a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and separates men at the same time.
Among other things, it seems worthwhile to draw attention to Arendt's idiosyncratic understanding of the "world" especially since this is the world the love of which Arendt announced in her personal motto, Amor Mundi. Think of the way in which we are born into a speech, a "mother tongue," the existence of which long precedes our birth and will continue on long after our death, but which, for all that still consists entirely of our own performances of it, performances that at once sustain it in its existence but also change it (through coinages, figurative deviations, and so on).
Hannah Arendt on Common Sense
This is from The Human Condition, pp. 283-284. To be clear here, Arendt is proposing that two quite radically different modes of rationality have been described with the term "common sense," and that the prevailing one substitutes for public deliberation an instrumental calculation insensitive to, and indeed obliterative of, the fragile substance of enacted and re-enacted human freedom (for which, in any case, it also substitutes the meaningless seductions of an endlessly amplified instrumental force). I'm pushing the grammar of the first sentence quite a bit here -- though not to the cost of its actual sense, I am confident -- not because I think it is unclear or ungraceful as written (far from it), but just because I want to stress the way in which it is proposing the key distinction on which what follows depends:
Note that in denying that humans can have the structure of their minds identically in common, Arendt is not denying that there is obvious salient structural overlap in that structure (in fact, she takes this for granted by the paragraph's end), she is denying instead that salience is restricted to the ways in which they do overlap. Philip Rieff's encomium to Freud, that he "democratized genius by giving everybody a creative unconscious," is very much in point here. That we might indeed be neurocomputationally identical in our shared recourse to instrumental rationality provides little reason to imagine we are comparably identical in our capacity to make meaning, express value, divert literal into figurative language, unpredictably interrupt custom and calculation and so "change the subject" in the deepest sense and so on. To deny that "strictly speaking," we actually "cannot have in common" the "structure of [our] minds" is actually to a certain extent little more than the facile materialist admission that we think with different brains even when we think with them similarly, but also that the material structure of these different brains surely materially attest to the different memories, customs, dispositions they incarnate. Be that as it may, Arendt is freighting this distinction of instrumental as against deliberative conceptions of common sense with extraordinary significance. She continues:
Here, I believe, we find the gesture of superlativity in perhaps an unexpected place, perhaps a foundational place, in which an initial reduction or impoverishment of reason into instrumentality is compensated by a promissory amplification of instrumentality, means without end or ends, functionally substituting force for freedom.
It is crucial to grasp that the "reality" from which this instrumentalized mind is cut off is the substantial reality of the public sphere, the world in common made and sustained by peers acting in concert. Arendt is not literally mistaking instrumentalization as a kind of comatose state, although she would likely point out that both states amount to the radical objectification of a subject no longer able legibly to act in the world on her own. Arendt is not denying that objects of calculation have an alterity that can frustrate our ends and confound our expectations, but proposing that they must first be constituted as objects, subsumed within our conventions, to be legible as frustrating or confounding in salient ways in the first place. Under the mode of instrumentalization a thing to be known must first be made by us or made-knowable by us, we can only trust what we make. This is an argument she elaborates at great length prior to the passage I have quoted here, in an extended reading of the Cartesian Doubt. As always, there is much more to say here than I have time to say it where Arendt is concerned. For now, I will treat the next couple of sentences continuing from the passage above as a conclusion of this particular discussion:
What intrigues me about this last comment is that while it seems to decry the reduction of human beings to the status of animals (a reduction that has never much disturbed me, since I am quite happy to concede nonhuman animals their share of dignity and a stake in the collaboration of peers in sharing and making a world worth living in), it seems to mark more emphatically in fact the further reduction of human animals to mere mechanisms, an altogether more troubling move it seems to me, and one prone to all sorts of mischief.
[C]ommon sense... once had been the ["sense"] by which all other senses, with their intimately private sensations, were fitted into the common world, just as vision fitted man into the visible world[. But] now [it has become] an inner faculty without any world relationship. This sense now [is] called common merely because it happened to be common to all. What men [sic] now have in common is not the world but the structure of their minds, and this they cannot have in common, strictly speaking; their faculty of reasoning can only happen to be the same in everybody. The fact that, given the problem of two plus two we all will come out with the same answer, four, is henceforth the very model of common-sense reasoning.
Note that in denying that humans can have the structure of their minds identically in common, Arendt is not denying that there is obvious salient structural overlap in that structure (in fact, she takes this for granted by the paragraph's end), she is denying instead that salience is restricted to the ways in which they do overlap. Philip Rieff's encomium to Freud, that he "democratized genius by giving everybody a creative unconscious," is very much in point here. That we might indeed be neurocomputationally identical in our shared recourse to instrumental rationality provides little reason to imagine we are comparably identical in our capacity to make meaning, express value, divert literal into figurative language, unpredictably interrupt custom and calculation and so "change the subject" in the deepest sense and so on. To deny that "strictly speaking," we actually "cannot have in common" the "structure of [our] minds" is actually to a certain extent little more than the facile materialist admission that we think with different brains even when we think with them similarly, but also that the material structure of these different brains surely materially attest to the different memories, customs, dispositions they incarnate. Be that as it may, Arendt is freighting this distinction of instrumental as against deliberative conceptions of common sense with extraordinary significance. She continues:
Reason, in Descartes no less than in Hobbes, becomes "reckoning with consequences," the faculty of deducing and concluding, that is, of a process which man at any moment can let loose in himself. The mind of this man -- to remain in the sphere of mathematics -- no longer looks upon "two-plus-two-are-four" as an equation in which two side balance in a self-evident harmony, but understands the equation as the expression of a process in which two and two become four in order to generate further processes of addition which eventually will lead into the infinite.
Here, I believe, we find the gesture of superlativity in perhaps an unexpected place, perhaps a foundational place, in which an initial reduction or impoverishment of reason into instrumentality is compensated by a promissory amplification of instrumentality, means without end or ends, functionally substituting force for freedom.
This faculty [ie, instrumental calculation] the modern age calls common-sense reasoning; it is the playing of the mind with itself, which comes to pass when the mind is shut off from all reality and "senses" only itself.
It is crucial to grasp that the "reality" from which this instrumentalized mind is cut off is the substantial reality of the public sphere, the world in common made and sustained by peers acting in concert. Arendt is not literally mistaking instrumentalization as a kind of comatose state, although she would likely point out that both states amount to the radical objectification of a subject no longer able legibly to act in the world on her own. Arendt is not denying that objects of calculation have an alterity that can frustrate our ends and confound our expectations, but proposing that they must first be constituted as objects, subsumed within our conventions, to be legible as frustrating or confounding in salient ways in the first place. Under the mode of instrumentalization a thing to be known must first be made by us or made-knowable by us, we can only trust what we make. This is an argument she elaborates at great length prior to the passage I have quoted here, in an extended reading of the Cartesian Doubt. As always, there is much more to say here than I have time to say it where Arendt is concerned. For now, I will treat the next couple of sentences continuing from the passage above as a conclusion of this particular discussion:
Whatever difference there may be [between intelligent individuals, once their intelligence is reduced to instrumentality] is a difference of mental power, which can be tested and measured like horsepower. Here the old definition of man as an animal rationale acquires a terrible precision: deprived of the sense through which man's five animal senses are fitted into a world common to all men, human beings are indeed no more than animals who are able to reason, "to reckon with consequences."
What intrigues me about this last comment is that while it seems to decry the reduction of human beings to the status of animals (a reduction that has never much disturbed me, since I am quite happy to concede nonhuman animals their share of dignity and a stake in the collaboration of peers in sharing and making a world worth living in), it seems to mark more emphatically in fact the further reduction of human animals to mere mechanisms, an altogether more troubling move it seems to me, and one prone to all sorts of mischief.
Hannah Arendt on Futurology
Arendt is speaking here of "think tanks" like the Rand Corporation who were gaming out genocidal and suicidal war scenarios in the epoch of Vietnam and Mutually Assured Destruction and with the most murderous and disastrous imaginable consequences, fancying themselves consummately rational in their palpable irrationality all the while. Arendt is not addressing what I describe as superlativity here, but it will be very clear that superlativity is an intelligible amplification of this thoughtlessness misconstrued as deliberation. The piece is excerpted from On Violence, from the anthology Crises of the Republic, pp. 108-110.
This last comment is crucial, since with this judgment it becomes clear that Arendt's earlier description of the futurologists as "scientifically-minded" was not an attack on science but on a kind of pseudo-science that sells itself as science. Needless to say, the "unthinkable" in this passage is mostly a matter of the actual contemplation of nuclear war (an inherently and absolutely unreasonable and unconscionable calculation), but we know from the "Prologue" to The Human Condition that it is not only the unprecedented self-destructive potential of nuclear weapons that confront humanity with its dissolution via the thoughtless unfolding of the instrumental logic arising from technique unrestrained by public deliberation, indeed technique amplified and misconstrued as an apt substitute for the freedom of public deliberation.
In Superlativity, in my sense of the term, the "unthinkable" has connected up to the theological "unthinkable," to the Mystery of Divinity evoked by the very incoherence of the omni-predicates through which "God" is presumably apprehended as unapprehendable. The promise of personal transcendence via the technodevelopmental aspirations to superintelligence, superlongevity, and superabundance preoccupy superlative futurology, but they are pseudo-scientific in Arendt's sense of the term, while mobilizing the anti-scientific energies of the Mystery as well. Taking up the superficial coloration of scientificity while failing to pass muster according to its legitimate forms, even more extraordinarily Superlativity evokes worldly experiences like intelligence, life, and emancipation, and then evacuates them of their worldly substance as biological, social, historical phenomena in a repudiation of the world and embrace of supernatural reward ("The Future") that is quintessentially faithful.
Arendt's critique of futurology continues on, a bit further down the page. You will discover that I am not forcing a false association on Arendt in describing her critique as anti-"futurological," even if I do extend its terms in a number of ways I can't know she would approve of.
The force of this final point turns on Arendt's understanding of common sense, and as it happens that understanding of common sense is one that made her an early under-appreciated critic of the traditional program of artificial intelligence. I will turn briefly to that understanding in my next post. What I would emphasize for now, though, is that Arendt is not simply making the claim that futurology underestimates the complexity and dynamism and vicissitudes of the history it claims to predict and so should take greater care to qualify its overconfident assertions (although that is indeed a recommendation that most futurologists would do well to take on board). She is actually making the more forceful claim that futurology as a discourse is premised on the substitution of the mode of reason that is instrumental calculation for the mode of reason that is public deliberation, and since the latter for Arendt is incomparably more suited to address the substance of human history -- the narrative of a diversity of peers unpredictably acting in the world -- to which futurology seeks to address its own attention, this substitution of instrumentality for deliberation risks more than factual and predictive errors but more seriously still the inculcation of an insensitivity to that substance of history and its freedom that actually manages to undermine its reality. To lose sight of differences that make a difference, like the difference between political power and instrumental force or the correlated difference between public deliberation and instrumental calculation, results, as Arendt writes later in the same piece, "in a kind of blindness to the realities they correspond to" (p. 142), and since these are political realities that must be enacted and re-enacted to maintain their reality, blindness to their salience is too likely the prelude to their loss.
The other thing to say is that it is possible, as always, to read Arendt's lucid and graceful prose with a sense of real gratification but without quite grasping the full force of her arguments, since she deploys everyday terms like "routine," "act," "calculation" in a very specific rather than glib way, and that the force of her account ultimately derives from the ways in which these terms are embedded in the provocative constellation of distinctions she is endlessly introducing into conventional thinking while sometimes seeming simply to be thinking conventionally. This makes even long excerpting of her work a tricky business, since it is easier than usual to draw an incomplete or misleading insight from taking her writing out of its extended context. I hope I can recompense the risk of multiplying such misunderstandings through injudicious excerpting by seducing readers into reading the actual texts on their own terms through judicious excerpting.
[T]here are, indeed, few things that are more frightening than the steadily increasing prestige of scientifically minded brain trusters in the councils of government during the last decades. The trouble is not that they are cold blooded enough to "think the unthinkable," but that they do not think. Instead of indulging in such an old-fashioned, uncomputerizable activity, they reckon with the consequences of certain hypothetically assumed constellations without, however, being able to test their hypotheses against actual occurrences. The logical flaw in these hypothetical constructions of future events is always the same: what first appears as a hypothesis -- with or without its implied alternatives, according to the level of sophistication -- turns immediately, usually after a few paragraphs, into a 'fact,' which then gives birth to a whole string of non-facts, with the result that the purely speculative character of the whole enterprise is forgotten. Needless to say, this is not science but pseudo-science[.]
This last comment is crucial, since with this judgment it becomes clear that Arendt's earlier description of the futurologists as "scientifically-minded" was not an attack on science but on a kind of pseudo-science that sells itself as science. Needless to say, the "unthinkable" in this passage is mostly a matter of the actual contemplation of nuclear war (an inherently and absolutely unreasonable and unconscionable calculation), but we know from the "Prologue" to The Human Condition that it is not only the unprecedented self-destructive potential of nuclear weapons that confront humanity with its dissolution via the thoughtless unfolding of the instrumental logic arising from technique unrestrained by public deliberation, indeed technique amplified and misconstrued as an apt substitute for the freedom of public deliberation.
In Superlativity, in my sense of the term, the "unthinkable" has connected up to the theological "unthinkable," to the Mystery of Divinity evoked by the very incoherence of the omni-predicates through which "God" is presumably apprehended as unapprehendable. The promise of personal transcendence via the technodevelopmental aspirations to superintelligence, superlongevity, and superabundance preoccupy superlative futurology, but they are pseudo-scientific in Arendt's sense of the term, while mobilizing the anti-scientific energies of the Mystery as well. Taking up the superficial coloration of scientificity while failing to pass muster according to its legitimate forms, even more extraordinarily Superlativity evokes worldly experiences like intelligence, life, and emancipation, and then evacuates them of their worldly substance as biological, social, historical phenomena in a repudiation of the world and embrace of supernatural reward ("The Future") that is quintessentially faithful.
Arendt's critique of futurology continues on, a bit further down the page. You will discover that I am not forcing a false association on Arendt in describing her critique as anti-"futurological," even if I do extend its terms in a number of ways I can't know she would approve of.
Events, by definition, are occurrences that interrupt routine processes and routine procedures; only in a world in which nothing of importance ever happens could the futurologists' dream come true. Predictions of the future are never anything but projections of present automatic processes and procedures, that is, of occurrences that are likely to come to pass if men [sic] do not act and if nothing unexpected happens; every action, for better or worse, and every accident necessarily destroys the whole pattern in whose frame the prediction moves and where it finds its evidence. Proudhon's passing remark, "The fecundity of the unexpected far exceeds the statesman's prudence," is fortunately still true. It exceeds even more obviously the expert's calculations.) To call such unexpected, unpredicted, and unpredictable happenings "random events" or "the last gasps of the past," condemning them to irrelevance or the famous "dustbin of history," is the oldest trick in the trade; the trick, no doubt, helps in clearing up the theory, but at the price of removing it further and further from reality. The danger is that these theories are not only plausible, because they take their evidence from actually discernible present trends, but that, because of their inner consistency, they have a hypnotic effect; they put to sleep our common sense, which is nothing else but our mental organ for perceiving, understanding, and dealing with reality and factuality.
The force of this final point turns on Arendt's understanding of common sense, and as it happens that understanding of common sense is one that made her an early under-appreciated critic of the traditional program of artificial intelligence. I will turn briefly to that understanding in my next post. What I would emphasize for now, though, is that Arendt is not simply making the claim that futurology underestimates the complexity and dynamism and vicissitudes of the history it claims to predict and so should take greater care to qualify its overconfident assertions (although that is indeed a recommendation that most futurologists would do well to take on board). She is actually making the more forceful claim that futurology as a discourse is premised on the substitution of the mode of reason that is instrumental calculation for the mode of reason that is public deliberation, and since the latter for Arendt is incomparably more suited to address the substance of human history -- the narrative of a diversity of peers unpredictably acting in the world -- to which futurology seeks to address its own attention, this substitution of instrumentality for deliberation risks more than factual and predictive errors but more seriously still the inculcation of an insensitivity to that substance of history and its freedom that actually manages to undermine its reality. To lose sight of differences that make a difference, like the difference between political power and instrumental force or the correlated difference between public deliberation and instrumental calculation, results, as Arendt writes later in the same piece, "in a kind of blindness to the realities they correspond to" (p. 142), and since these are political realities that must be enacted and re-enacted to maintain their reality, blindness to their salience is too likely the prelude to their loss.
The other thing to say is that it is possible, as always, to read Arendt's lucid and graceful prose with a sense of real gratification but without quite grasping the full force of her arguments, since she deploys everyday terms like "routine," "act," "calculation" in a very specific rather than glib way, and that the force of her account ultimately derives from the ways in which these terms are embedded in the provocative constellation of distinctions she is endlessly introducing into conventional thinking while sometimes seeming simply to be thinking conventionally. This makes even long excerpting of her work a tricky business, since it is easier than usual to draw an incomplete or misleading insight from taking her writing out of its extended context. I hope I can recompense the risk of multiplying such misunderstandings through injudicious excerpting by seducing readers into reading the actual texts on their own terms through judicious excerpting.
Sunday, April 19, 2009
Superlativity Is Neither Enlightened Nor Scientific
Upgraded and adapted from a response of mine in the Moot:
There is nothing in current technique that "implies" the arrival at the superlative outcome in which you are personally invested.
What I see is humanity discovering things and applying these discoveries to the solution of shared problems (and usually creating new problems as we go along) where you seem to see a "trend," a series of stepping stones along the path to an idealized superlative outcome. This time, you are calling it "control of matter with atomic precision." What you probably really mean by this is something like the arrival of "drextech," or the "nanofactory," a robust programmable poly-purpose self-replicating room-temperature device that can transform cheap feedstock into nearly any desirable commodity with a software recipe.
I call this superlative outcome "superabundance," and this particular superlative aspiration is also familiar in a great deal of digital utopianism and virtuality discourse of the last decade, just as it suffused discourses of automation and plastic in the post-war period before that, just as it drove the alchemical project of turning lead into gold for ages before that.
The aspiration to superabundance is the infantile fantasy of a circumvention of the struggle with necessity, ananke: in psychoanalytic terms a pining for a return to the plenitude represented by the Pleasure Principle and renunciation of the exactions represented by the Reality Principle. Or, in different terms, it is an anti-political fantasy of a circumvention of the struggle to reconcile the ineradicable diversity of the aspirations of our peers with whom we share the world (where all are satisfied, no personally frustrating reconciliation is necessary).
In both of these aspects, it seems to me that this superlative aspiration is an irrationalist repudiation of the heart of what Enlightenment has typically seen as its substance -- the struggle for autonomous adulthood (as against subjection by parental, priestly, or otherwise unaccountable authorities) and for the consensualization, via general welfare and the rule of law, of the disputatious public sphere. It is worth noting that many superlative futurologists like to sell themselves as exemplars of "Enlightenment" while indulging in this infantilism, anti-politicism, and irrationalism. In a word, they're not.
It is not the available science that inspires your superlative aspirations, but science that provides the pretext and rationalization for your indulgence in what is an essentially faith-based initiative.
We are talking here and now about superabundance and in particular superabundance in its nano-Santalogical variant, but the same sorts of moves are taking place in the other variations: in which Singularitarians, for example, indulge the wish-fulfillment fantasy of either personally achieving or at least of bearing witness to the arrival of post-biological superintelligence, the Robot God Who, if Friendly, solves all our problems for us, or Who, if Unfriendly, ends the world in an ubergoo apocalypse, in either case constituting a history-ending Singularity (hence the name of their particular variant of the Robot Cult); or in which techno-immortalists indulge the wish-fulfillment fantasy of personal immortality -- or superlongevity, or "indefinite lifespan" or whatever term that is currently fashionable among them to try to sounds less religious while pining after the quintessentially religious promise of eternal life.
Common to these discourses is the divestment of a familiar phenomenon (like personhood, intelligence, or life) of the actual organismic, social, and biological substance and context in which it has always hitherto been intelligible, very likely to the fatal cost of the coherence of the resulting ideas of these familiar phenomena, but then providing a compensation for this divestment of substance with an investment of radically hyperbolic aspiration. According to the terms of my Superlative critique, these hyperbolic aspirations function more or less as pseudo-scientific correlates to the conventional omni-predicates of theology -- omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence -- translated from the project to apprehend the supernatural divinity of God to the project of a personal transcendence into a differently super-natural demi-divinity via technoscience, characterized by superlative aspirations to superintelligence, superlongevity, and superabundance.
Now, quite apart from all that, you go on, in the usual way, earnestly to recommend to me that the cutting edge of superlative futurological discourse has abandoned this or that particular formulation, has taken up this or that "technical" variation, that I have failed to distinguish the position of Robot Cultist A from that of Robot Cultist B, and so on.
You will forgive me, but there is no need for those of us who confine our reasonable technoscientific deliberation to beliefs that are warranted by consensus science to lose ourselves in fine-grained appreciation of differences that fail to make the difference that actually makes a difference in such matters. You rattle off the handful of preferred figures who tell you what you want to hear, barnacled up in who knows what baroque jargon and ptolemaic epicycles, as though these are widely respected widely-cited figures outside your sub(cult)ure.
But they are not.
As a very easily discovered matter of fact, they are not.
It isn't a sign of discernment but of its opposite, as it happens, that you can recite the minute differences that distinguish three disputants on the question of how many angels can dance on a pin-head, when the overabundant consensus of relevant warranted belief has become either indifferent or hostile to the notion of angels dancing on pinheads as such.
It is the extraordinary assertion of belief that demands extraordinary proofs and patient elaborations. You are invested in a whole constellation of flabbergastingly extraordinary claims -- expectations of superhumanization and near-immortalization and paradisical plenitude -- and yet seem to demand as the price of skeptical engagement with your discourse that critics become conversant with disputes the relevance of which depends on the prior acceptance of the whole fantastically marginal and extraordinary enterprise in which they are embedded. Meanwhile, the public life of your discourse, whatever the technical details you believe to undergird it, continues to proceed at a level of generality and hyperbole built up of metaphors, citations of myth, activations of infantile wish-fulfillment fantasies, and supported, at most, with vague conjurations of inevitable progress, triumphalist reductionism, and a handful of "existence proofs," usually from biology, that aren't actually analogous at all in their specificity to the idealized outcomes that drive superlativity, at least not at the bedeviling level of detail that concerns consensus scientists and accountable policy-makers but not so much ideologues, priests, and scam artists.
We are offered up claims built upon claims built upon claims, few of which have excited the interest or support of a consensus of scientists in the relevant fields, and fewer still of which invest these claims with the idealized outcomes that are the preoccupation of those who indulge most forcefully in superlative discourses as such.
Superlativity, in a word, is not science. It is a discourse, opportunistically taking up a highly selective set of scientific results and ideas and diverting them to the service of a host of wish-fulfillment fantasies that are very old and very familiar, dreams of invulnerability, certainty, immortality, and abundance that rail against the finitude of the human condition.
They are a distraction and derangement of those aspects of Enlightenment that would mobilize collective intelligence, expressivity, and effort to the progressive democratization, consensualization, and diversification of public life and the practical solution of shared problems.
Progress is not transcendence, nor is enlightenment a denial of human finitude.
There is more than enough sensationalism and irrationalism distorting urgently needed sensible public deliberation on, for example, the environmental and bioethical quandaries of disruptive technoscientific change at the moment.
The Robot Cultists and their various noise machines are not helping. At all.
There is nothing in current technique that "implies" the arrival at the superlative outcome in which you are personally invested.
What I see is humanity discovering things and applying these discoveries to the solution of shared problems (and usually creating new problems as we go along) where you seem to see a "trend," a series of stepping stones along the path to an idealized superlative outcome. This time, you are calling it "control of matter with atomic precision." What you probably really mean by this is something like the arrival of "drextech," or the "nanofactory," a robust programmable poly-purpose self-replicating room-temperature device that can transform cheap feedstock into nearly any desirable commodity with a software recipe.
I call this superlative outcome "superabundance," and this particular superlative aspiration is also familiar in a great deal of digital utopianism and virtuality discourse of the last decade, just as it suffused discourses of automation and plastic in the post-war period before that, just as it drove the alchemical project of turning lead into gold for ages before that.
The aspiration to superabundance is the infantile fantasy of a circumvention of the struggle with necessity, ananke: in psychoanalytic terms a pining for a return to the plenitude represented by the Pleasure Principle and renunciation of the exactions represented by the Reality Principle. Or, in different terms, it is an anti-political fantasy of a circumvention of the struggle to reconcile the ineradicable diversity of the aspirations of our peers with whom we share the world (where all are satisfied, no personally frustrating reconciliation is necessary).
In both of these aspects, it seems to me that this superlative aspiration is an irrationalist repudiation of the heart of what Enlightenment has typically seen as its substance -- the struggle for autonomous adulthood (as against subjection by parental, priestly, or otherwise unaccountable authorities) and for the consensualization, via general welfare and the rule of law, of the disputatious public sphere. It is worth noting that many superlative futurologists like to sell themselves as exemplars of "Enlightenment" while indulging in this infantilism, anti-politicism, and irrationalism. In a word, they're not.
It is not the available science that inspires your superlative aspirations, but science that provides the pretext and rationalization for your indulgence in what is an essentially faith-based initiative.
We are talking here and now about superabundance and in particular superabundance in its nano-Santalogical variant, but the same sorts of moves are taking place in the other variations: in which Singularitarians, for example, indulge the wish-fulfillment fantasy of either personally achieving or at least of bearing witness to the arrival of post-biological superintelligence, the Robot God Who, if Friendly, solves all our problems for us, or Who, if Unfriendly, ends the world in an ubergoo apocalypse, in either case constituting a history-ending Singularity (hence the name of their particular variant of the Robot Cult); or in which techno-immortalists indulge the wish-fulfillment fantasy of personal immortality -- or superlongevity, or "indefinite lifespan" or whatever term that is currently fashionable among them to try to sounds less religious while pining after the quintessentially religious promise of eternal life.
Common to these discourses is the divestment of a familiar phenomenon (like personhood, intelligence, or life) of the actual organismic, social, and biological substance and context in which it has always hitherto been intelligible, very likely to the fatal cost of the coherence of the resulting ideas of these familiar phenomena, but then providing a compensation for this divestment of substance with an investment of radically hyperbolic aspiration. According to the terms of my Superlative critique, these hyperbolic aspirations function more or less as pseudo-scientific correlates to the conventional omni-predicates of theology -- omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence -- translated from the project to apprehend the supernatural divinity of God to the project of a personal transcendence into a differently super-natural demi-divinity via technoscience, characterized by superlative aspirations to superintelligence, superlongevity, and superabundance.
Now, quite apart from all that, you go on, in the usual way, earnestly to recommend to me that the cutting edge of superlative futurological discourse has abandoned this or that particular formulation, has taken up this or that "technical" variation, that I have failed to distinguish the position of Robot Cultist A from that of Robot Cultist B, and so on.
You will forgive me, but there is no need for those of us who confine our reasonable technoscientific deliberation to beliefs that are warranted by consensus science to lose ourselves in fine-grained appreciation of differences that fail to make the difference that actually makes a difference in such matters. You rattle off the handful of preferred figures who tell you what you want to hear, barnacled up in who knows what baroque jargon and ptolemaic epicycles, as though these are widely respected widely-cited figures outside your sub(cult)ure.
But they are not.
As a very easily discovered matter of fact, they are not.
It isn't a sign of discernment but of its opposite, as it happens, that you can recite the minute differences that distinguish three disputants on the question of how many angels can dance on a pin-head, when the overabundant consensus of relevant warranted belief has become either indifferent or hostile to the notion of angels dancing on pinheads as such.
It is the extraordinary assertion of belief that demands extraordinary proofs and patient elaborations. You are invested in a whole constellation of flabbergastingly extraordinary claims -- expectations of superhumanization and near-immortalization and paradisical plenitude -- and yet seem to demand as the price of skeptical engagement with your discourse that critics become conversant with disputes the relevance of which depends on the prior acceptance of the whole fantastically marginal and extraordinary enterprise in which they are embedded. Meanwhile, the public life of your discourse, whatever the technical details you believe to undergird it, continues to proceed at a level of generality and hyperbole built up of metaphors, citations of myth, activations of infantile wish-fulfillment fantasies, and supported, at most, with vague conjurations of inevitable progress, triumphalist reductionism, and a handful of "existence proofs," usually from biology, that aren't actually analogous at all in their specificity to the idealized outcomes that drive superlativity, at least not at the bedeviling level of detail that concerns consensus scientists and accountable policy-makers but not so much ideologues, priests, and scam artists.
We are offered up claims built upon claims built upon claims, few of which have excited the interest or support of a consensus of scientists in the relevant fields, and fewer still of which invest these claims with the idealized outcomes that are the preoccupation of those who indulge most forcefully in superlative discourses as such.
Superlativity, in a word, is not science. It is a discourse, opportunistically taking up a highly selective set of scientific results and ideas and diverting them to the service of a host of wish-fulfillment fantasies that are very old and very familiar, dreams of invulnerability, certainty, immortality, and abundance that rail against the finitude of the human condition.
They are a distraction and derangement of those aspects of Enlightenment that would mobilize collective intelligence, expressivity, and effort to the progressive democratization, consensualization, and diversification of public life and the practical solution of shared problems.
Progress is not transcendence, nor is enlightenment a denial of human finitude.
There is more than enough sensationalism and irrationalism distorting urgently needed sensible public deliberation on, for example, the environmental and bioethical quandaries of disruptive technoscientific change at the moment.
The Robot Cultists and their various noise machines are not helping. At all.
Wednesday, April 15, 2009
Let's Talk About Cultishness
On the one hand, I find the organizational forms of superlative futurology so ridiculous that I often judge that they demand nothing but ridicule in return. But, on the other hand, I think that the discourses of superlative futurology represent a symptom and reductio of prevailing neoliberal developmental discourse that repays our more serious scrutiny and I also think that the hyperbolic rhetoric arising out of the sub(cult)ures of superlative futurology are congenial to sensationalist mass media and contribute in ways we should take seriously to the derangement of sensible deliberation on technodevelopmental questions at an important historical moment of disruptive change. So, I regard superlativity as ridiculous but I take it seriously, too. In the moments in which I am impressed most by its ridiculousness I find myself referring to organized sub(cult)ural formations of superlative futurology as "The Robot Cult" and its representatives as "Robot Cultists." How apt is that charge when all is said and done, and just how glib am I being in making it? Let's talk about that a little bit, shall we?
I will take another comment by "Hjalte" that I've upgraded and adapted from the Moot, this time one in which she takes umbrage at some of the insinuations arising from the charge of Robot Cultism, as the occasion for some scattered speculations on the relations of superlative futurology, its organized forms, the sub(cult)ures associated with these, and finally the derisive designation of Robot Cultism itself.
"Hjalte" protests: It is not like I worship the man as if he was the guru in some sort of robot cult. I said particularly: not that he is the first to come up with such ideas. And those other people I refer to is not (just) the rest of the incrowd at SIAI. It is people like Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett, and likely countless other philosophers and neuroscientists of whom I have not heard. (maybe even some of the old Greek philosophers as well, they had moments of good insight). Also I don’t say that anyone possess full knowledge of these issues, though the state of the art may be a little above ”various reactions going on in the brain”.
The "man" in question is would-be guru Eliezer Yudkowsky of the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, which one might describe, together with would-be guru Ray Kurzweil's Singularity U, as something like Robot Cult Ground Zero. Sam Harris, needless to say, isn't a neuroscientist. Daniel Dennet is a philosopher. I liked his book Elbow Room very much, and like him I am a champion of Darwin and enjoy some of the things he writes in championing Darwin himself. It's nice that you like some of the Greeks, as well. Me too. I must say that there is a strange mushy amalgam of bestselling popular science authors and "the new atheism" polemicists with a broad family resemblance, rather than an explicit program exactly, holding them together, mostly involving a rather pointless and hysterical assertion in my view of technical triumphalism through reductionism. I always find myself wishing secularists would go back to reading James and Dewey rather than all this facile reductionism misconstrued as respect for science. This is a brutal oversimplification, but it seems to me, roughly speaking, that in mis-identifying fundamentalism with the humanities, they tend to advocate a reductionism that re-writes science itself in the image of a priestly authoritarianism with too much in common with the very fundamentalisms they claim to disdain (and rightly so).
Anyway, it's easy to see why you would connect the Robot Cultists you cherish to this popular science assembly (some of the authors in which I personally find more or less appealing myself in their proper precinct), and probably in a loose sort of way with the Edge.org folks (I tend to gravitate predictably enough more toward the more progressive and capacious Seed Scienceblogs set myself). This amalgam of insistent scientism -- again, I'm painting with too broad a brush, but you take my point, I'm hoping -- is more or less what the American Ayn Rand enthusiasts, also something of a cult, mind you, of the 60s mutated into, by way of the L5 society, by the time of the irrational exuberance of the 90s. Wired's libertechian "digirati" and Extropian transhumanism were very much a part of that moment -- to their everlasting embarrassment one would think. Vinge, Kurzweil, Yudkowsky either originated together with it or arise out of it (of these three, only Vinge is a figure of lasting significance in my opinion). This fandom-cum-sub(cult)ure hasn't really changed all that much in broad outline over the years, apart from occasional terminological refurbishments and fumigations in the name of organizational PR, since Ed Regis offered his arch ethnography Great Mambo Chicken way back. Brian Alexander's Rapture, written years and years later is most extraordinary in my view for the lack of change in the futurological cast of characters he discovers, the claims they make, the (lack of) influence they exert in their marginality, and so on.
Be all that as it may, let's have something a reality check here, shall we?
If you are concerned about software and network security issues (and there are plenty of good reasons to be), you certainly need not join a Robot Cult to work on them, you need not think of yourself as a "member" of a "movement" that publishes more online manifestos than actually cited scientific papers.
Why would efforts to address software and network security issues impel one into a marginal sub(cult)ure in which one finds a personal identity radically at odds with most of one's peers and what is taken to be a perspective on and place within a highly idiosyncratic version of human history freighted with the tonalities of transcendence and apocalypse?
I don't doubt you when you say that you do not literally worship would-be Robot Cult gurus like Yudkowsky or Kurzweil or Max More or whoever (depending on the particular flavor of superlativity you most invest in personally), but the fact remains that these figures are incredibly marginal to scientific consensus, and you locate yourself very insistently outside that mainstream yourself when theirs are the terms you take up to understand what is possible and important and problematic in the fields of your greatest interest.
The fact that this self-marginalization is typically coupled among superlative futurologists with the assumption of a defensive assertion that in fact you represent a vanguard championing a super-scientificity while you actually actively disdain consensus-scientificity suggests there are other things afoot in this identity you have assumed for whatever reasons than simply a desire to solve software and network security problems.
There are, after all, thousands upon thousands of serious, credentialized, published professionals and students working to solve such problems who have never heard of any of the people you take most seriously and who, upon hearing of them, would laugh their assess off. This possibly should matter to you.
Transhumanism, singularitarianism, techno-immortalism, extropianism, and all the rest might seem to differ a bit from classic cult formations in that they do tolerate and even celebrate dissenting views on the questions that preoccupy their attention. What one notices however is that the constellation of problems at issue for them are highly marginal and idiosyncratic yet remain unusually stable, and the disputatious positions assumed in respect to these issues are also fairly stable as well.
The "party line" for the Robot Cult is not so much a matter of memorizing a Creed and observing Commandments, but of taking seriously as nobody else on earth does (sometimes by going through the ritual motions of dispute itself) a set of idealized outcomes -- outcomes that would just happen to confer personal "transcendence" on those who are preoccupied with them, namely, superintelligence, superlongevity, and superabundance -- and fixating on a set of "technical" problems (not accepted as priorities in the consensus scientific fields on which these "technical" vocabularies parasitically depend) standing in the way of the realization of those idealized outcomes and the promise of that transcendence.
It is not so much a hard party-line that is policed by the Robot Cult, but a circumscription of debate onto an idiosyncratic set of marginal problems and marginal "technical" vocabularies in the service of superlative transcendentalizing aspirations rather than conventional progressive technodevelopmental aspirations.
This marginality is compensated by the fraught pleasures of a highly defensive sub(cult)ural identification, the sense of being a vanguard rather than an ignoramus or a crank, the sense of gaining a highly simplified explanatory narrative and a location within it as against the ignorance and confusion that likely preceded the conversion experience (or, to be more generous about it, for some, the assumption of the futurological enthusiasm that impelled them into this particular fandom), not to mention the offering up of a tantalizing glimpse and promise of superlative aspirations, however conceptually confused, however technically implausible.
For some, superlativity functions as a straightforward faith-based initiative, and mobilizes the conventional authoritarian organizational circuit of True Believers and would-be Priestly Authorities, while for others it is a self-marginalizing sub(cult)ural enthusiasm more like a fandom. The fandom may be less psychologically damaging and less fundamentalist and less prone to authoritarianism (or not), but it nurtures and mobilizes the worst extremes in organized superlative futurology all the same.
The True Believers and the Fans will all refer just the same to "the movement" and to themselves as "transhumanists" or "singularitarians" or what have, imagining themselves different sorts of people in consequence of their identification with that movement and with the Movement of History in which it is imagined uniquely to participate along a path to transcendence or apocalypse.
Beyond all that, as I said, superlative futurology also continues to provide an illuminating symptom and clarifyingly extreme variation on prevailing neoliberal developmental discourse as such, which is saturated with reductionisms, determinisms, utopianisms, eugenicisms, and libertopianisms very much like the ones the find their extreme correlates in superlative futurology. It is as both sympton and reductio of neoliberal developmentalism that superlative futurology probably best repays our considered attention.
On their own, the Robot Cultists are a rather clownish collection, even if one should also pay close attention to the ways in which sensationalist media take up their facile and deranging framings of technodevelopmental quandaries to the cost of sense at the worst possible historical moment, and also one should remain vigilant about the organizational life of superlative futurology since even absurd marginal groups of boys with toys who say useful things to incumbent interests while fancying themselves the smartest people in the room and Holders of the Keys of History can do enormous damage if they connect to good funding sources however palpably idiotic their actual views (as witness Nazis and Neocons and all the usual suspects in this dumb dreary disastrous vein).
I will take another comment by "Hjalte" that I've upgraded and adapted from the Moot, this time one in which she takes umbrage at some of the insinuations arising from the charge of Robot Cultism, as the occasion for some scattered speculations on the relations of superlative futurology, its organized forms, the sub(cult)ures associated with these, and finally the derisive designation of Robot Cultism itself.
"Hjalte" protests: It is not like I worship the man as if he was the guru in some sort of robot cult. I said particularly: not that he is the first to come up with such ideas. And those other people I refer to is not (just) the rest of the incrowd at SIAI. It is people like Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett, and likely countless other philosophers and neuroscientists of whom I have not heard. (maybe even some of the old Greek philosophers as well, they had moments of good insight). Also I don’t say that anyone possess full knowledge of these issues, though the state of the art may be a little above ”various reactions going on in the brain”.
The "man" in question is would-be guru Eliezer Yudkowsky of the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, which one might describe, together with would-be guru Ray Kurzweil's Singularity U, as something like Robot Cult Ground Zero. Sam Harris, needless to say, isn't a neuroscientist. Daniel Dennet is a philosopher. I liked his book Elbow Room very much, and like him I am a champion of Darwin and enjoy some of the things he writes in championing Darwin himself. It's nice that you like some of the Greeks, as well. Me too. I must say that there is a strange mushy amalgam of bestselling popular science authors and "the new atheism" polemicists with a broad family resemblance, rather than an explicit program exactly, holding them together, mostly involving a rather pointless and hysterical assertion in my view of technical triumphalism through reductionism. I always find myself wishing secularists would go back to reading James and Dewey rather than all this facile reductionism misconstrued as respect for science. This is a brutal oversimplification, but it seems to me, roughly speaking, that in mis-identifying fundamentalism with the humanities, they tend to advocate a reductionism that re-writes science itself in the image of a priestly authoritarianism with too much in common with the very fundamentalisms they claim to disdain (and rightly so).
Anyway, it's easy to see why you would connect the Robot Cultists you cherish to this popular science assembly (some of the authors in which I personally find more or less appealing myself in their proper precinct), and probably in a loose sort of way with the Edge.org folks (I tend to gravitate predictably enough more toward the more progressive and capacious Seed Scienceblogs set myself). This amalgam of insistent scientism -- again, I'm painting with too broad a brush, but you take my point, I'm hoping -- is more or less what the American Ayn Rand enthusiasts, also something of a cult, mind you, of the 60s mutated into, by way of the L5 society, by the time of the irrational exuberance of the 90s. Wired's libertechian "digirati" and Extropian transhumanism were very much a part of that moment -- to their everlasting embarrassment one would think. Vinge, Kurzweil, Yudkowsky either originated together with it or arise out of it (of these three, only Vinge is a figure of lasting significance in my opinion). This fandom-cum-sub(cult)ure hasn't really changed all that much in broad outline over the years, apart from occasional terminological refurbishments and fumigations in the name of organizational PR, since Ed Regis offered his arch ethnography Great Mambo Chicken way back. Brian Alexander's Rapture, written years and years later is most extraordinary in my view for the lack of change in the futurological cast of characters he discovers, the claims they make, the (lack of) influence they exert in their marginality, and so on.
Be all that as it may, let's have something a reality check here, shall we?
If you are concerned about software and network security issues (and there are plenty of good reasons to be), you certainly need not join a Robot Cult to work on them, you need not think of yourself as a "member" of a "movement" that publishes more online manifestos than actually cited scientific papers.
Why would efforts to address software and network security issues impel one into a marginal sub(cult)ure in which one finds a personal identity radically at odds with most of one's peers and what is taken to be a perspective on and place within a highly idiosyncratic version of human history freighted with the tonalities of transcendence and apocalypse?
I don't doubt you when you say that you do not literally worship would-be Robot Cult gurus like Yudkowsky or Kurzweil or Max More or whoever (depending on the particular flavor of superlativity you most invest in personally), but the fact remains that these figures are incredibly marginal to scientific consensus, and you locate yourself very insistently outside that mainstream yourself when theirs are the terms you take up to understand what is possible and important and problematic in the fields of your greatest interest.
The fact that this self-marginalization is typically coupled among superlative futurologists with the assumption of a defensive assertion that in fact you represent a vanguard championing a super-scientificity while you actually actively disdain consensus-scientificity suggests there are other things afoot in this identity you have assumed for whatever reasons than simply a desire to solve software and network security problems.
There are, after all, thousands upon thousands of serious, credentialized, published professionals and students working to solve such problems who have never heard of any of the people you take most seriously and who, upon hearing of them, would laugh their assess off. This possibly should matter to you.
Transhumanism, singularitarianism, techno-immortalism, extropianism, and all the rest might seem to differ a bit from classic cult formations in that they do tolerate and even celebrate dissenting views on the questions that preoccupy their attention. What one notices however is that the constellation of problems at issue for them are highly marginal and idiosyncratic yet remain unusually stable, and the disputatious positions assumed in respect to these issues are also fairly stable as well.
The "party line" for the Robot Cult is not so much a matter of memorizing a Creed and observing Commandments, but of taking seriously as nobody else on earth does (sometimes by going through the ritual motions of dispute itself) a set of idealized outcomes -- outcomes that would just happen to confer personal "transcendence" on those who are preoccupied with them, namely, superintelligence, superlongevity, and superabundance -- and fixating on a set of "technical" problems (not accepted as priorities in the consensus scientific fields on which these "technical" vocabularies parasitically depend) standing in the way of the realization of those idealized outcomes and the promise of that transcendence.
It is not so much a hard party-line that is policed by the Robot Cult, but a circumscription of debate onto an idiosyncratic set of marginal problems and marginal "technical" vocabularies in the service of superlative transcendentalizing aspirations rather than conventional progressive technodevelopmental aspirations.
This marginality is compensated by the fraught pleasures of a highly defensive sub(cult)ural identification, the sense of being a vanguard rather than an ignoramus or a crank, the sense of gaining a highly simplified explanatory narrative and a location within it as against the ignorance and confusion that likely preceded the conversion experience (or, to be more generous about it, for some, the assumption of the futurological enthusiasm that impelled them into this particular fandom), not to mention the offering up of a tantalizing glimpse and promise of superlative aspirations, however conceptually confused, however technically implausible.
For some, superlativity functions as a straightforward faith-based initiative, and mobilizes the conventional authoritarian organizational circuit of True Believers and would-be Priestly Authorities, while for others it is a self-marginalizing sub(cult)ural enthusiasm more like a fandom. The fandom may be less psychologically damaging and less fundamentalist and less prone to authoritarianism (or not), but it nurtures and mobilizes the worst extremes in organized superlative futurology all the same.
The True Believers and the Fans will all refer just the same to "the movement" and to themselves as "transhumanists" or "singularitarians" or what have, imagining themselves different sorts of people in consequence of their identification with that movement and with the Movement of History in which it is imagined uniquely to participate along a path to transcendence or apocalypse.
Beyond all that, as I said, superlative futurology also continues to provide an illuminating symptom and clarifyingly extreme variation on prevailing neoliberal developmental discourse as such, which is saturated with reductionisms, determinisms, utopianisms, eugenicisms, and libertopianisms very much like the ones the find their extreme correlates in superlative futurology. It is as both sympton and reductio of neoliberal developmentalism that superlative futurology probably best repays our considered attention.
On their own, the Robot Cultists are a rather clownish collection, even if one should also pay close attention to the ways in which sensationalist media take up their facile and deranging framings of technodevelopmental quandaries to the cost of sense at the worst possible historical moment, and also one should remain vigilant about the organizational life of superlative futurology since even absurd marginal groups of boys with toys who say useful things to incumbent interests while fancying themselves the smartest people in the room and Holders of the Keys of History can do enormous damage if they connect to good funding sources however palpably idiotic their actual views (as witness Nazis and Neocons and all the usual suspects in this dumb dreary disastrous vein).
Robotic Reductionism
Upgraded and adapted from the Moot, "Hjalte" wrote (as nicely excerpted by "AnneC"):
I am a materialist on matters of mind, I have been a cheerful atheist for a quarter century, I am a champion of consensus science, not a scientist by any means but hardly uninformed about technoscience questions, and my politics are those of secular progressive consensual democracy.
You are simply straightforwardly not understanding my point. I don't agree that it is particularly heretical or harrowing to attribute consciousness to neurochemistry in an organismic brain.
Indeed, that statement shouldn't be the least bit of a surprise to you since one of my repeated accusations against the so-called Singularitarians, dead-enders as most of them are in the old school Program of Strong AI (and this has even been a repeated accusation of mine quite literally in the very thread to which you are contributing and which I would imagine, then, that you have taken the time to read), is that despite their own materialism they tend to treat the actual substantial form of materialization hitherto associated with intelligence as comparatively negligible, fancying that complex software and the complex behaviors it can provoke can be properly denominated as "intelligence" without arising out of anything like the dynamisms or exhibiting anything like the dynamisms of the actually-existing organismic intelligences from which they are appropriating the term.
Despite these failures, their discourse is nonetheless saturated with the paraphernalia of intelligence as it is actually incarnated in the world. Discussions of artificial intelligence inevitably lead into discussions of intentions, values, optimizations, smartness, personhood, rights, friendliness and so on, none with any good justification.
To a certain extent these figurative borrowings from one domain to another to prop up our understanding of a new phenomena and new problems are inevitable and useful. The term in rhetoric to describe this figure is catachresis, in case you're interested (I teach this stuff to my university students), which describes derangements of literal usage to describe phenomena to which they didn't originally apply and also to describe the coinage of new terms to accomplish this (these coinages, after all, typically involve borrowings from other languages and so on).
Usually these borrowings are functionally proto-theoretical, their plausibility builds on the sense, right or wrong, of the analogical or associational propriety of the traffic between the old and the new domain over which the borrowing is taking place. Also, the trace of the older associations of the term reverberate into the new usages, yielding rich ramifying associations that continue to exert their force on the ways new usages play out in the world.
It would seem to me that the attribution of "intelligence" to computers and, subsequently, the reduction of intelligence to computation has been an enormously compelling catachresis that has palpably confused far more than it has illuminated and in fact has yielded a poisonous harvest of incomprehension where matters of testifying to the experiences of critical and abstract and empathetic and passionate and imaginative thinking, understanding, and judgment are concerned, the testifying on which distinctively human forms of agency and meaning actually depend for their abiding intelligibility, force, and flourishing.
It is not materialism as such that has hollowed out the human understanding of our own freedom and agency and meaningfulness, it is an instrumentalization of reason that was never compelled by materialism and which has made its advocates ever more insensitive to and dismissive of the difference between persons and robots, the difference between the exercise of freedom in the presence of one's peers and the exertion of instrumental force translating means into ends. Instrumentality, of course, cannot provide the ends at which its efficiencies should be aimed, and so freedom rewritten in the image of its imperialism is exactly what one would expect of a robot, blind, meaningless, brute-force mistaken as emancipation rather than the radical impoverishment it would be. This is not a problem of materialism, it is a problem of reductionism.
The heretic thought that consciousness is nothing but the way the various reactions going on in the brain feels when that brain happens to be yours ... [surely] sounds like hollowing out of human experience of the worst kind imaginable.
I am a materialist on matters of mind, I have been a cheerful atheist for a quarter century, I am a champion of consensus science, not a scientist by any means but hardly uninformed about technoscience questions, and my politics are those of secular progressive consensual democracy.
You are simply straightforwardly not understanding my point. I don't agree that it is particularly heretical or harrowing to attribute consciousness to neurochemistry in an organismic brain.
Indeed, that statement shouldn't be the least bit of a surprise to you since one of my repeated accusations against the so-called Singularitarians, dead-enders as most of them are in the old school Program of Strong AI (and this has even been a repeated accusation of mine quite literally in the very thread to which you are contributing and which I would imagine, then, that you have taken the time to read), is that despite their own materialism they tend to treat the actual substantial form of materialization hitherto associated with intelligence as comparatively negligible, fancying that complex software and the complex behaviors it can provoke can be properly denominated as "intelligence" without arising out of anything like the dynamisms or exhibiting anything like the dynamisms of the actually-existing organismic intelligences from which they are appropriating the term.
Despite these failures, their discourse is nonetheless saturated with the paraphernalia of intelligence as it is actually incarnated in the world. Discussions of artificial intelligence inevitably lead into discussions of intentions, values, optimizations, smartness, personhood, rights, friendliness and so on, none with any good justification.
To a certain extent these figurative borrowings from one domain to another to prop up our understanding of a new phenomena and new problems are inevitable and useful. The term in rhetoric to describe this figure is catachresis, in case you're interested (I teach this stuff to my university students), which describes derangements of literal usage to describe phenomena to which they didn't originally apply and also to describe the coinage of new terms to accomplish this (these coinages, after all, typically involve borrowings from other languages and so on).
Usually these borrowings are functionally proto-theoretical, their plausibility builds on the sense, right or wrong, of the analogical or associational propriety of the traffic between the old and the new domain over which the borrowing is taking place. Also, the trace of the older associations of the term reverberate into the new usages, yielding rich ramifying associations that continue to exert their force on the ways new usages play out in the world.
It would seem to me that the attribution of "intelligence" to computers and, subsequently, the reduction of intelligence to computation has been an enormously compelling catachresis that has palpably confused far more than it has illuminated and in fact has yielded a poisonous harvest of incomprehension where matters of testifying to the experiences of critical and abstract and empathetic and passionate and imaginative thinking, understanding, and judgment are concerned, the testifying on which distinctively human forms of agency and meaning actually depend for their abiding intelligibility, force, and flourishing.
It is not materialism as such that has hollowed out the human understanding of our own freedom and agency and meaningfulness, it is an instrumentalization of reason that was never compelled by materialism and which has made its advocates ever more insensitive to and dismissive of the difference between persons and robots, the difference between the exercise of freedom in the presence of one's peers and the exertion of instrumental force translating means into ends. Instrumentality, of course, cannot provide the ends at which its efficiencies should be aimed, and so freedom rewritten in the image of its imperialism is exactly what one would expect of a robot, blind, meaningless, brute-force mistaken as emancipation rather than the radical impoverishment it would be. This is not a problem of materialism, it is a problem of reductionism.
Sunday, April 12, 2009
Pretending To Be Biologists
Why do so many computer scientists throng the ranks of superlative futurology?
I'll grant -- as many do not -- that at least some of "computer science" really is a science, rather than always only just engineering practices or art practices (although an enormous amount of "computer science" is indeed better described that way), say, a science struggling to understand principles underlying material forms of information processing or something like that.
As I said, I'll grant that at least some computer scientists really are scientists. Of course, many of the Robot Cultists don't even have degrees in computer science, however loosely construed, and indeed many of them, I daresay probably most of them, are little more than serfs robotically coding in the veal fattening pens that pimple corporate America but sell themselves in techno-utopian chatrooms (and possibly also, sadly, to themselves) as the equivalent of plasma physicists.
It makes a certain sense at least that one would find code-jockey handwavers of the "cybernetic totalist" school of non-thought among the singularitarian Robot God branch of superlative futurology and among the "Mind Uploading" enthusiasts. But why do computer coders throng the nanofactory crowd, and the cryonics crowd, and the negligible senescence longevity medicine crowd as well -- communities of futurological faithfulness preoccupied with scientific questions about which they endlessly declare their consummate superiority to scientific consensus but which depend most of all on biology?
I'll grant -- as many do not -- that at least some of "computer science" really is a science, rather than always only just engineering practices or art practices (although an enormous amount of "computer science" is indeed better described that way), say, a science struggling to understand principles underlying material forms of information processing or something like that.
As I said, I'll grant that at least some computer scientists really are scientists. Of course, many of the Robot Cultists don't even have degrees in computer science, however loosely construed, and indeed many of them, I daresay probably most of them, are little more than serfs robotically coding in the veal fattening pens that pimple corporate America but sell themselves in techno-utopian chatrooms (and possibly also, sadly, to themselves) as the equivalent of plasma physicists.
It makes a certain sense at least that one would find code-jockey handwavers of the "cybernetic totalist" school of non-thought among the singularitarian Robot God branch of superlative futurology and among the "Mind Uploading" enthusiasts. But why do computer coders throng the nanofactory crowd, and the cryonics crowd, and the negligible senescence longevity medicine crowd as well -- communities of futurological faithfulness preoccupied with scientific questions about which they endlessly declare their consummate superiority to scientific consensus but which depend most of all on biology?
Saturday, April 11, 2009
Actions Are Not Behaviors
Here's more debate with the steadfast Singularitarians, again adapted from exchanges playing out at Accelerating Future, this time zeroing in on some assumptions that get to the heart of some of these disputes in my view. Also, I daresay the differences getting aired here are not confined always only to the superlative futurologists, who represent in this a symptom and expressive extremity of this sort of rhetoric, but point to prevailing assumptions that problematically suffuse the techno-determinism and reductionism of a great deal of corporate-militarist developmental discourse more generally.
I said, at some point or other, that "I think the words 'smart' 'intelligent' [and] 'act' shouldn’t be used literally to describe mechanical behavior."
In response to which I received from "Roko": So, the thinking process isn’t limited to only biological organisms, but the thinking process isn’t a mechanical computing either? It’s something we can’t imitate with any kind of a machine? Do I understand you correctly?
In response to this same statement of mine "Thom" responded: [Y]ou are directly contradicting literally the whole field of artificial intelligence. From the wikipedia article on AI:
I do indeed regard "the thinking process" as one limited to biological organisms, as a factual, empirical matter in the present, except in science fiction and futurological handwaving in which it has exactly the same substantial existence as do the ghosts and wizards and wands in Harry Potter books. The forms that actually-existing intelligence takes in the world should surely matter to people who claim to care about science as much as Robot Cultists claim to do. Among many other things, it is true that I find the term “thought” to be one that encompasses more personal experiences and worldy phenomena than just reckoning with consequences in my view. Part of the way I try to get at this difference is to stipulate a pretty conventional distinction, at least in technical philosophical debates turning on the present issues, between the "acts" of subjects (as relatively free actors) and the "behaviors" of objects (as mere mechanical playthings): I don't claim that this distinction always accords with common usage, but I think it often does, and at any rate helps us get at a difference that makes a difference to us in moral, aesthetic, ethical, and political matters.
Is it right to say of this move of mine that in it I am "directly contradicting literally the whole field of artificial intelligence"?
I would distinguish, in a rough and tumble sort of way, the actual software-coding practices, useful general principles, and testable results of that field, on the one hand, from the rhetorical practices through which narrative and figurative frames are mobilized to educate, inspire, and make sense of practices, principles, and results of that field, on the other hand. The notion of "artificial intelligence" as it presently plays out in the world depends for its force on conceptual confusions and ill-digested metaphors as far as I can see.
You will notice that shade-aversive plants are no more intelligent than machines that also satisfy the definition of intelligence cited above. Further, it is rightly a matter of some controversy whether we should impute “success” to the behavior of a system that has no personal stake in its accomplishment. And, again, I have used the word “behavior” because I want to distinguish in this context acting as a political term from behavior as a more conventionally causal one. Strictly speaking, it is not a denigration of the useful results arising out of computer science (even when it decides it wants to call itself "artificial intelligence" without reason or sense), to point out that there are practical, conceptual, ethical, and other problems afoot in the ways in which computer science sometimes goes on to make sense of what it is doing and where it is going.
I said, at some point or other, that "I think the words 'smart' 'intelligent' [and] 'act' shouldn’t be used literally to describe mechanical behavior."
In response to which I received from "Roko": So, the thinking process isn’t limited to only biological organisms, but the thinking process isn’t a mechanical computing either? It’s something we can’t imitate with any kind of a machine? Do I understand you correctly?
In response to this same statement of mine "Thom" responded: [Y]ou are directly contradicting literally the whole field of artificial intelligence. From the wikipedia article on AI:
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the intelligence of machines and the branch of computer science which aims to create it. Major AI textbooks define the field as “the study and design of intelligent agents,” where an intelligent agent is a system that perceives its environment and takes actions which maximize its chances of success.
I do indeed regard "the thinking process" as one limited to biological organisms, as a factual, empirical matter in the present, except in science fiction and futurological handwaving in which it has exactly the same substantial existence as do the ghosts and wizards and wands in Harry Potter books. The forms that actually-existing intelligence takes in the world should surely matter to people who claim to care about science as much as Robot Cultists claim to do. Among many other things, it is true that I find the term “thought” to be one that encompasses more personal experiences and worldy phenomena than just reckoning with consequences in my view. Part of the way I try to get at this difference is to stipulate a pretty conventional distinction, at least in technical philosophical debates turning on the present issues, between the "acts" of subjects (as relatively free actors) and the "behaviors" of objects (as mere mechanical playthings): I don't claim that this distinction always accords with common usage, but I think it often does, and at any rate helps us get at a difference that makes a difference to us in moral, aesthetic, ethical, and political matters.
Is it right to say of this move of mine that in it I am "directly contradicting literally the whole field of artificial intelligence"?
I would distinguish, in a rough and tumble sort of way, the actual software-coding practices, useful general principles, and testable results of that field, on the one hand, from the rhetorical practices through which narrative and figurative frames are mobilized to educate, inspire, and make sense of practices, principles, and results of that field, on the other hand. The notion of "artificial intelligence" as it presently plays out in the world depends for its force on conceptual confusions and ill-digested metaphors as far as I can see.
You will notice that shade-aversive plants are no more intelligent than machines that also satisfy the definition of intelligence cited above. Further, it is rightly a matter of some controversy whether we should impute “success” to the behavior of a system that has no personal stake in its accomplishment. And, again, I have used the word “behavior” because I want to distinguish in this context acting as a political term from behavior as a more conventionally causal one. Strictly speaking, it is not a denigration of the useful results arising out of computer science (even when it decides it wants to call itself "artificial intelligence" without reason or sense), to point out that there are practical, conceptual, ethical, and other problems afoot in the ways in which computer science sometimes goes on to make sense of what it is doing and where it is going.
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