None of this is to reduce politics to voting: education, agitation, organization, legislation in the classroom, in publication, on the streets, in the voting booth all have their vital contributions to make to the work of democracy and equity-in-diversity: None are sufficient, all are necessary.
I don't expect to appreciate Hillary Clinton so much as I have President Obama -- although I admire much of her lifetime advocacy for women, and considered some of her policy positions more progressive than Obama's in 2008, even while preferring Obama more at the time, overall -- but I do hold out hope that she will surprise me on this score. Even if she does not, the choice to support her strongly and then vote for her is quite easy. In a time of science-denialism, white-racism, plutocratic deregulatory looting, gun-fanaticism, forced-abortion zealotry, loud and unanimous across the Republican Party, necessities make for quite easy choices.
But even in a world in which Republicans were not the party of evil idiotic madness, it would remain true that politics are neither ethics nor aesthetics, that when the lesser of two evils represents a difference that makes a difference (and it always does), that it is politically necessary to fight for that difference -- when from an ethical vantage that choice would likely mean an embrace of evil or from an aesthetic vantage that choice would likely mean undermining integrity or spoiling beauty.
The problem at hand is recognizing that voting is a political matter to be judged politically. In politics what is possible and what is important in a shared present in a finite world are shaped by making compromises and deploying compromised instruments. Politics is the interminable reconciliation of the infinite demands and aspirations of the stakeholders with whom we share the present world in its and our own finitude. Politics can be an instrument of the moral or the ethical, the spectacle and experience of the political can be judged aesthetically -- but it is crucial that one distinguish these experiences, these judgments, these ends, and the beliefs that invest them if those beliefs, and the conduct based on them, are to be reasonable.
I am a pluralist about truth, which means that for me reasonableness is a matter not only of acting on the basis of truths, belief in which are warranted as reasonable, but also a matter of identifying the criteria of warrant relevant to the domain of belief besetting us. Scientific, prudential, moral, ethical, legal, professional, aesthetic, political beliefs are different from one another, the sense they confer, the demand they make, the criteria for their warrant differ. It is profoundly unreasonable to expect all truths to be reducible to one mode, although demands for foolish consistencies of this kind are commonplace in the self-righteous, the self-congratulatory, the self-satisfied, and above all, the selfish. Although such people often imagine themselves and are often depicted as paragons of reasonableness, integrity, and consistence, they are dangerous fools and their reason a deadly thing.